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Introduction 
U.S. domestic demand for farm output in expanding only 1 percent per year while 
supply (due to productivity gains alone) is expanding 1.5 percent per year. Without 
expansion of export markets, American farm and food firms face a stagnant or declining 
demand relative to supply. Asian Pacific Rim markets offer a happy combination of need 
and buying power, the latter backed by impressive rates of economic growth. Opportunity 
awaits, but American farm and food firms will need to play an active rather than passive 
role or the markets will go to our competitors. 
The Asian Pacific Rim is America's largest and fastest growing agricultural export 
market. It includes but is by no means limited to our largest single agricultural export 
market, Japan. Relatively speaking, American farm and food firms are as successful at 
exporting to Japan as Japan's auto and electronics firms are at exporting to the United 
States. · 
The theme of this set of papers is that, despite past success in exporting, major new 
opportunities await American agricultural product exporters to the Asian Pacific Rim: 
* 
* 
* 
• 
* 
Nonnan Rask highlights the broad scope of the Asian market. Although we 
properly give attention to currently large markets in Asia, Rask reminds us 
that Japan, Korea, and Taiwan which account for 30 percent of U.S. 
agricultural exports, accounts for only 6 percent of Asia's population! If China 
and India, for example, with high man-land ratios would make institutional 
reforms to promote more rapid economic growth and open markets, the trade 
potential of that 2 billion person market is staggering. 
Dennis Henderson and James Dayton identify numerous trade opportunities for 
high-value agricultural products. Unfortunately, the U.S. frequently has lagged 
behind competing exporters in realizing opportunities for such agricultural 
products. 
John Nichols summarizes an impressive list of studies documenting the high 
payoff from U.S. farm export promotion. 
Maury Bredahl articulates the perceptions, attitudes, and reality of institutions 
that facilitate and, too often, impede agricultural product trade. He shows 
that trade policies motivated by myth and serving narrow special interests cost 
developed and developing nations billions of dollars each year. 
James Gleckler and Luther Tweeten target a more narrow topic - the potential 
benefits and costs of a U.S.-Japan free trade agreement. Economic benefits 
especially to Japan are massive. 
1X 
* 
* 
Jong-Yong Kim provides opturusm that even seemingly inscrutable and 
intractable forces of agricultural protectionism are giving way. Few countries 
have benefited more from open world trade than Korea and it is coming to 
recognize that trade is a two-way street in which distortions have been 
blocking agricultural imports. He contends that roadblocks to agricultural 
exports to Korea are coming down as rapidly as the domestic political process 
will allow. 
Joseph Cristo provides one example of the many success stories of Ohio food 
processing firms expanding sales in Asian Pacific Rim markets. 
X 
U.S. Trade Patterns and Prospects for Asia: 
Bulk Commodities 
Norman Rask * 
Asia is the largest and most rapidly growing regional market for U.S. agricultural 
exports. It is a very dynamic region, especially in the Pacific Rim area, where the bulk of 
U.S. agricultural export markets are located. There is great diversity among Asian countries 
in level of development, rates of economic growth, freedom and openness of markets, 
agricultural production potential, and population size. The nature of individual country 
markets reflects this diversity. Among its countries, this region contains the largest 
individual U.S. agricultural market (Japan), rich and poor countries, large and small 
countries, some very rapidly growing countries, major market-Oistorting policies in a number 
of countries, and overall, a limited production response capability to meet the huge future 
food demands that will result from a large, growing, and increasingly affluent population. 
My purpose in this paper is to put a number of these contrasts in perspective as they 
relate to current markets for U.S. agricultural exports and, perhaps more importantly, to 
future trade prospects. I begin with a general summary of the region. 
A large U.S. market: 
Large population base: 
Rapid economic growth: 
Summary 
Almost 50 percent of U.S. agricultural exports currently go to 
Asia. This percentage is increasing each year, while all other 
regional markets are stable or declining. 
With 58 percent of the world's population and a moderate 
population growth rate of 1.6 percent per year, there is 
substantial export growth potential. 
Rapid economic growth is especially noticeable among low- and 
middle-income Asian countries, particularly in the Pacific Rim 
region. Growth in income for such countries leads to diet 
changes that include more livestock products and induced 
increases in feed grain requirements. 
"Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 
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Limited land resources: 
Policy distortions: 
Policy changes: 
Growing U.S. markets: 
Large future potential: 
Land resources, measured in arable land per capita, vary 
considerable by country but, overall, Asia has only one-half the 
world average and only one-sixth as much as North America. 
Arable land in China has actually declined five percent in the 
last 15 years due to land degradation and non-agricultural uses. 
In a number of important Asian markets, food and agricultural 
policies favor agricultural production, discourage food 
consumption, and thus limit agricultural imports. These 
distortions are sufficiently large to have limited U.S. export 
potential to the region substantially in recent years. 
Fortunately, recent policy changes and promised future changes 
will begin to open more markets to U.S. exports and should 
improve agricultural trade to the region. 
Several countries in the Pacific Rim with a combination of the 
above factors are important and rapidly growing markets for 
U.S. agricultural exports. In the Pacific Rim we find our first 
(Japan), third (South Korea), seventh (Taiwan), and eighth 
(China) largest agricultural export markets. 
None of the Asian markets is approaching saturation. A large 
population, limited agricultural resources, positive policy 
changes, and rapid economic development from a relatively low 
development base all point to substantial market expansion 
potential in the years ahead. 
U.S. Agricultural Exports 
Over the past fifteen years, Asia has been the one bright spot for U.S. agricultural 
exports, rising from about 30 percent of U.S. exports in the mid 1970s to 47 percent in 1988. 
All other regions have either remained constant or declined. For example, Western Europe 
has declined from 35 percent to 18 percent. Exports to Latin America increased modestly 
during the late 1970s but have plateaued and declined marginally in the 1980s, primarily 
from hugh external debt problems and little or no economic growth. Exports to the 
Centrally Planned Economies of Eastern Europe and the USSR have fluctuated between 
5 and 12 percent depending on weather. Africa has been a small market determined largely 
by aid of various forms (Figure 1). 
Within Asia, the major export markets are in the Pacific Rim, where four countries 
account for one-third of all U.S. agricultural exports. Japan is our number one market and 
takes a growing 20 percent of U.S. agricultural exports. South Korea is our third most 
important market accounting for 6 percent of U.S. exports and Taiwan and China (numbers 
seven and eight) each account for 4 percent of U.S. exports (Table 1). 
2 
Figure 1. 
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Table 1. Major U.S. Export Markets, 1988-89. 
Country Billion Dollars %Total 
Asia 18.8 47 
Japan 8.1 20 
South Korea 2.5 6 
Taiwan 1.6 4 
China 1.5 4 
Western Europe 7.4 18 
Latin America 5.1 13 
USSR 3.5 9 
Africa 2.4 6 
From a U.S. commodity export perspective, Asia is an average market for grains, 
taking about 48 percent of U.S. exports, compared to 47 percent of all commodities; a less 
than average market for soybeans and soybean products with only 36 percent of U.S. 
exports; and better than average market for livestock products at 55 percent of total U.S. 
livestock product exports. For beef and pork products, (82 and 71 percent), Asia is a 
dominate market, and within Asia almost all U.S. beef and pork exports go to Japan. 
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For reasons discussed below, exports of U.S. livestock products to the Japanese 
market are likely to increase in the future with similar but less dramatic increases possible 
in Taiwan and South Korea. Exports to China are likely to be concentrated more in the 
feed grain category. 
From a country perspective, the U.S. provides about 80 percent of Japan's import 
needs for com and soybeans, and 60 percent of wheat imports. For South Korea, the U.S. 
share is 50 percent for wheat, 80.percent for corn, and almost 100 percent for soybeans. 
Taiwan depends on the U.S. for 90 percent of its wheat and com imports, and almost 100 
percent of its soybean imports. For total agricultural imports, the U.S. share for Japan is 
35 percent, for South Korea 48 percent, and for Taiwan 43 percent. 
Determinates of Trade 
A number of conditions affect the amount and specific composition of agricultural 
trade for a particular country. An important issue is whether a country is capable of being 
self-sufficient in food production. Beyond this, determinants of trade include the level and 
pace of economic development; specific agricultural, food, and trade policies; and 
agricultural resource endowment, including technology. 
Basically, trade in agricultural products occurs when there is an imbalance between 
production and consumption. If production is greater than consumption, a country becomes 
a net exporter; if consumption is greater than production a country becomes a net importer. 
Countries will often change their import-export status at different levels of development. 
Of the two measures (consumption and production), consumption is the more dynamic and 
passes through distinct phases as countries develop. Consumption increases rapidly in early 
stages of development as increased incomes are used to upgrade diets to greater quantities 
of livestock products, and then plateaus at high income levels where income growth bas 
little impact on consumption behavior. Production usually demonstrates a more predictable 
path of slow steady growth based on technological change. It lags behind consumption as 
economic and population growth expand with an economic takeoff. With technological 
transfer and buildup of internal scientific capacity, production growth can begin to catch up 
with population growth, reducing import growth. The process is speeded by production 
subsidies. 
Consumption 
The interactions of consumption and production trends for any particular country 
throughout the development process present a dynamic and changing trade picture. For 
example, with an average level of agricultural resource endowment, a country typically 
passes through three phases of food self-sufficiency as development progresses. At very low 
income levels, self-sufficiency is close to one since surplus foreign exchange is not available 
to purchase food imports. This is the case today for a number of poor countries of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. Food trade with these countries is very limited. 
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As development occurs and incomes rise, the demand for food increases more 
rapidly than increases in agricultural production. This is true even if agricultural growth 
is the primary source of the increased income. For example in Taiwan, with high 
agricultural growth rates of about 5 percent per year in the 1960-1980 period, food 
consumption grew much faster than production, moving Taiwan from being agriculturally 
self-sufficient in 1960 to importing one-third of its agricultural product needs by 1980. 
Thus, countries in this low and middle income stage, especially if they are growing rapidly, 
provide a very strong market potential. This is the case with South Korea, Taiwan, China, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and a number of other countries, and is the reason that Asia is such 
a dynamic agricultural export market for the U.S. today. 
At high levels of income, diet changes are satisfied, and income growth has little 
impact on consumption. However, production, driven by technological change, continues 
to increase and this can result eventually in positive levels of food self-sufficiency if 
sufficient agricultural resources exist. This will result in countries changing from net 
importers to net exports and thus, from markets to competitors. This is the case with many 
Western European countries today but, because of limited land resources, it is unlikely to 
happen to any great extent in Asia. · 
Production 
Agricultural resource endowments in Asia are relatively limited. For example, arable 
land per capita in all of Asia is .14 hectares, about one-half the world average and only 
one-sixth of the arable land per capita in North America (Table 2). 
Table 2. Arable Land, World Regions, 1986. 
Country Total Per Capita 
(mil. hectares) (hectares) 
Asia 421 .14 
North America 235 .87 
USSR 228 .81 
Africa 166 .28 
Latin America 149 .35 
Europe 125 .25 
Oceania _J2_ .l2Q_ 
World 1,373 .27 
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Within Asia, significant differences in the level of arable land per capita are 
apparent (Table 3). Thailand and India at .33 and .21 hectares per capita are among the 
better agriculturally endowed countries. But even here, India is just self-sufficient at very 
low income and consumption levels. While Thailand has been an important exporter of 
rice and corn, recent economic growth has resulted in increased local consumption. This 
has constrained exports of agricultural products. 
Table 3. Arable Land, Asia, 1986. 
Country Total Per Capita 
(mil. hectares) (hectares) 
India 166 .21 
China 94 .09 
Pakistan 20 .20 
Thailand 18 .33 
Indonesia 16 .09 
Bangladesh 9 .08 
Philippines 5 .08 
Japan 4 .03 
Korea 2 .05 
Malaysia 1 .06 
Taiwan 1 .05 
Asia 421 .14 
World 1,373 .27 
USA 188 .77 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are very poor in land resources. With economic 
growth they have experienced rapidly declining levels of self-sufficiency. For example, in 
1985, Japan imported 44 percent of its food supply, and South Korea and Taiwan more than 
one-third of their food needs. 
China has significant land resources but, with the largest population in the world, has 
only .09 hectares per capita, is relatively land poor. Further, with very intensive land use 
resulting in land degradation and with the transfer of substantial land area to non-
agricultural uses, arable land has declined 5 percent over the past fifteen years. 
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A substantial measure of economic freedom and incentive was given to Chinese 
farmers beginning in the late 1970s. The immediate result was a large increase in 
agricultural output and some short-run export competition as China sold limited amounts 
of grain in East Asian markets. However, this increased production has now been more 
than completely absorbed within China through diet changes related to improved incomes 
that were generated in large part by the increased agricultural production. As noted above, 
China is now our eighth most important market. In the future, increases in agricultural 
output in China will likely follow the more traditional technology related growth path and 
will not be able to keep pace with consumption changes. Thus, China should provide a 
growing market for U.S. exports. Political-economic reform emphasizing openness to world 
markets would further expand market opportunities there. 
Policies 
Food and agricultural policies are an additional factor that affect food production 
and consumption, and thus trade, in Asia. Agricultural subsidies and other protection 
measures are the most common policies, and have an indir~ct impact on consumption in 
addition to aiding farm producers. Generally, a subsidy to agricultural producers is a tax 
to consumption. Producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) are a common overall measure of 
degree of agricultural support. In Table 4, they are expressed as ·a percentage of total 
producer value. In Japan, PSEs are as high as 79 percent, indicating that for every yen 
received by Japanese farmers, 79 percent comes from government subsidy of some kind. 
Correspondingly, 39 percent of what consumers pay for food results indirectly from those 
subsidies. Similar policies favoring agricultural production and discouraging food 
consumption exist to a lesser degree in most other Asian countries. India is an exception, 
where a tax on agriculture actually results in a small subsidy to consumers. 
Table 4. Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents, 1986. 
Country 
Japan 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Indonesia 
India 
United States 
PSE CSE 
(Percent of Producer/Consumer Value) 
79 
58 
23 
20 
-11 
36 
-39 
-60 
-29 
-26 
3 
- 14 
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Thus, most policies affect trade negatively in two ways: first by encouraging 
additional production, and secondly by discouraging consumption. This phenomenon as 
noted above is very apparent in Japan and to a lesser extent in South Korea and Taiwan. 
In Japan, a quota on beef imports, for example, limits the amount of beef available in the 
internal market. This results in very high prices to consumers, causing a low level of 
consumption (Table 5). The high prices also encourage farmers to produce more beef, 
. further restricting the need for imports. Total meat consumption per capita in Japan is only 
one-third the level in the U.S., primarily due to these very high prices, though income levels 
are comparable in the two countries. 
Table 5. Retail Prices per Pound, U.S. Dollars, 1987. 
Commodity Japan Korea Taiwan u.s. Japan/U.S. 
Rice $ 1.65 $0.58 $0.45 $0.40 4.1 
Flour 0.65 0.14 0.29 0.20 3.2 
Beef 11.19 3.55 4.04 1.68 6.7 
Pork 4.63 1.75 2.28 1.90 2.4 
Chicken 3.34 0.96 0.78 4.3 
Recent policy changes in Japan and to a lesser extent in Korea and Taiwan, however, 
point to expanded trade possibilities. In Japan, quotas on beef imports are being phased 
out by 1993. Already consumption has increased 23 percent in the past three years (a 
similar increase in beef consumption has occurred in Taiwan). As prices come down, 
consumption will increase further, production will be discouraged and imports will increase 
dramatically. Beef imports now make up 50 percent of beef consumption in Japan and the 
U.S. provides one-half of the imports. 
An additional factor in Japanese agriculture also points to a rise in beef imports (and 
a sloWing of the growth in com and soybean imports). Historically, the U.S. has provided 
grains and soybeans as feed inputs to a growing beef production industry in Japan. With 
insufficient land resources to support beef breeding enterprises, the Japanese beef industry 
relies on dairy calves for feeder cattle. As long as consumption of dairy products was 
increasing, a growing supply of feeder animals was assured. Now that growth in the dairy 
industry has slowed, domestic beef production will have to plateau, and most beef 
consumption increases will need to be met with imports. At the same time, growth in 
exports of U.S. com and beans to Japan will probably be slower and tied more to growth 
in poultry and swine production then to beef consumption changes. 
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Economic Development 
Economic development levels vary widely when measured in income per capita 
(Table 6). With the strong yen, Japan has one of the highest levels of income per capita 
in the world. However, as noted earlier, very high food prices (Table 5) keep the Japanese 
population from consuming at a level commensurate with their income. In fact, many food 
items are priced at levels two to seven times greater than U.S. prices. 
Table 6. Income per Capita, Asia, 1987. 
Annual 
Growth 
Country 1987 (1965-87) 
Japan $19,494 4.2 
Hong Kong 8,229 6.2 
Taiwan 4,945 (6.5) 
S. Korea 2,690 6.4 
Malaysia 1,948 4.1 
Thailand 871 3.9 
Philippines 603 1.7 
Indonesia 411 4.5 
Pakistan 343 2.5 
India 326 1.8 
China 278 5.2 
United States 18,439 1.5 
The rapidly growing middle-income countries of Asia (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore) are the most dynamic markets and provide a significant share of the 
U.S agricultural export markets in the region, even though they have very modest 
population levels. 
Most of the large Asian countries are at very low income levels of about $400 per 
capita per year or less. Importantly, with the exception of the Philippines and the Indian 
subcontinent, most countries have growth rates exceeding four percent per year. Combining 
low and middle income status with four percent or better growth rates means that food 
consumption growth will outstrip food production in each of these countries and present 
important growth markets for U.S. exports. 
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Population Levels 
While per capita changes in income suggest prospects for export growth, total 
population strongly influences the potential size of the market. Here again, Asia with 58 
percent of the world's population presents very positive opportunities. Actually, the current 
strong markets of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (30 percent of U.S. agricultural exports) 
with a combined population of 184 million represent only 6 percent of the almost 3 billion 
people iii Asia (Table 7), an indication that we have only scratched the surface of a much 
larger potential market in Asia. 
Table 7. Population, Asia, 1987. 
Country 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Bangladesh 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Thailand 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Malaysia 
Hong Kong 
Asia 
Population 
(millions) 
1,048 
798 
171 
122 
106 
102 
58 
54 
42 
20 
16 
6 
2,911 
(58% of the world) 
Summary 
Future agricultural trade prospects in Asia depend on levels of economic 
development; economic growth rates; natural resources and food production possibilities; 
agricultural, food, and trade policies; and population levels. Each of these determinates is 
positive for future trade growth and together present a clear potential for continuing growth 
in U.S. agricultural trade with Asia. 
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The nature of that trade will be dynamic, with emphasis on feed and food grain trade 
to countries that have the agricultural resource possibilities to support substantial livestock 
populations such as China, and with greater emphasis on livestock product exports to land 
poor countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
A number of large Asian countries like India, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh, have yet to experience the degree of economic growth necessary to become 
substantial markets. Yet, in most of these heavily populated countries, the agricultural 
resource base will never be sufficient to support food demand increases that will come with 
development. This is the most important reality of the food equation in Asia and the 
reason for optimism concerning future trade prospects there. However, political and 
economic policy reform will be essential for some of these countries to realize their 
considerable potential for economic growth and trade. 
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U.S. Trade Patterns and Prospects for Asia: 
High Value Agricultural Products 
Dennis R. Henderson and James R. Dayton* 
Introduction 
The importance of international markets to the U.S. agricultural economy is 
illustrated by the observation that, over the past 15 years, the value of exports has equaled 
46.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the farm sector. Exports can be 
represented in many ways. For purposes here, they are. divided into two categories: 
primary commodities and high-value products. This paper addresses the latter -- from the 
perspectives of: (1) their relative importance in the mix of U.S. agricultural exports, (2) 
factors that appear to affect the competitiveness of the U.S. in international markets for 
these products, and (3) identification of high-potential markets for such products in Pacific 
Rim countries. 
High-value agricultural products are defined herein as those with a wholesale value 
that exceeds $400 per ton (1987 basis). They include high-value farm commodities such as 
live animals, fresh fruits and vegetables, and tree and ground nuts, and. value-added 
(processed) products such as meat, dairy and poultry products, cereal mill and bakery 
products, refined fats and oils, sugars and sweeteners, preserved fruits and vegetables, 
beverages and syrups, hides and skins, natural fiber products, tobacco products, and spices 
and extracts. On a volume basis these products account for less than .10 percent of all U.S. 
agricultural exports. But, because of their high per-unit value, they constitute nearly half 
of the value of all foreign sales of agricultural products (Table 1). 
High-value products account for a significantly larger share of total world trade in 
agricultural products than they do of the value of U.S. agricultural exports (Table 2). Thus, 
the U.S. appears to be relatively less competitive in international markets for these products 
than it is in markets for other agricultural goods, that is, primary commodities such as 
grains and oilseeds. 
"Professor and Research Specialist, respectively, Department of Agricultural Economics tmd Rural Sociology, Ohio 
State University. 
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Table 1. U.S. Agricultural Exports 
Year 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1988 
All Products 
($Million) 
4,832 
6,529 
7,259 
21,889 
41,233 
29,041 
37,093 
Hi~h V~lue Product~· 
$Million Percent 
2,749 56.9 
2,949 45.2 
3,449 47.5 
7;375 33.7 
17,362 42.1 
13,428 . 46.2 
18,227 49.1 
• Animals and products, fruits and preparations, vegetables and preparations, oilseed products, tobacco 
and products, natural fibers, seeds, sweeteners, beverages, and nursery products. 
Source: [1], various issues. 
Table 2. High Value Products as a Share of Agricultural Trade 
Year 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
Total World Trade 
85.2 
83.7 
75.9 
79.5 
82.1 
Source: Table 1 and [2], various ISSues. 
Percent 
U.S. Exports 
45.2 
47.5 
33.7 
42.1 
46.2 
Economic Impacts of High-Value Exports 
. High-value product exports are distinguished from other agricultural commodities 
in at least two ways: (1) they are more stable over time, and (2) they generate greater 
domestic economic activity. Because of these characteristics, exports of high-value products 
offer more significant benefits to the U.S. at large, and to the farm and food sector 
specifically, than do primary commodity exports. 
Annual variations in agricultural exports are shown in Table 3. Variability has 
increased over time, increasing economic uncertainty throughout the agricultural sector. 
However, annual variation in high-value exports is appreciably less than for primary 
commodities. Thus, these products provide a more stable source of income, helping to 
mitigate economic swings in the sector caused by gyrations in foreign sales. 
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Table 3. Annual Variation in Agricultural Exports 
1961-1988 1971-1988 1981-1988 
Average Annual Change, Billion Dollars 
All Products 
Primary Commodities 
High-Value Products 
Source: Compiled from [1]. 
2.5 
1.8 
1.0 
3.7 
2.5 
1.5 
4.1 
2.9 
1.5 
Domestic income effects of high-value exports are, in aggregate, about 55 percent 
greater than for primary commodities (Table 4 ). That is, each dollar of high-value product 
exports generates a total of $2.88 in earnings throughout the economy whereas a dollar's 
worth of primary commodity exports generates only $1.86 in total income. As logic 
suggests, the additional income from high-value exports comes in the down-stream 
processing and distribution industries, reflecting the value. added by industries beyond the 
farm gate. However, the farm-level income effects from high-value exports are about equal 
to those from primary commodities. This means that, income-wise, farmers as a group are 
essentially indifferent to the mix of products in the export account while those in the down-
stream industries benefit significantly from greater emphasis on high-value exports. By 
contrast, the up-stream farm input industries have a clear income-related preference for 
primary commodity exports. 
Table 4. Economic Multipliers for U.S. Agricultural Exports 
Total Up-Stream Farm-Level Down-Stream 
All Products 2.23 0.59 0.83 0.81 
Primary Commodities 1.86 0.72 0.85 0.29 
High-Value Products 2.88 0.31 0.78 1.79 
Source: [3] 
U.S. Competitiveness in World Markets for High-Value Products 
High-value product exports generate significant economic benefits. Such products 
also make up a substantially smaller share of U.S. agricultural exports than is their share 
of total world agricultural trade. Thus, it is important to understand what affects the 
competitiveness of American firms in world markets for these products. Most such products 
are produced by firms generally classified as food processors, thus the international market 
performance of the food processing industries provides some insights. 
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U.S. food processors are significantly less export oriented than are those in other 
industrial countries (Table 5). Among the other OECD countries, the food processing 
industries in only one, Japan, export a smaller share of output than does the U.S. By 
contrast, exports account for more than 40 percent of all processed food output in four of 
the 18 industrial countries examined: Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and New 
Zealand. Further, trends in recent years show exports becoming somewhat less significant 
for U.S.~ while increasing in relative importance for food processing firms throughout 
the industrial countries in general, Clearly, the export market performance of U.S. food 
processing industries as a group trails that of competing nations. Thus, the relatively low 
share of high-value products in the U.S. export product mix appears to be at least in part 
due to the lower competitiveness of U.S. food processors in world markets. 
Table 5. Exports as a Share of Processed Food Production 
18 OECD Countries• 
9 European Community Countries 
8 Other Non-U.S. OECD Countries 
United States 
• Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Source: [5] 
1975 1985 
19.2 
22.7 
11.5 
3.4 
Percent 
21.2 
27.2 
16.6 
3.1 
There are, nonetheless, some significant differences in the export performance of 
different food processing industries in the U.S. (Table 6). Even so, no single industry 
exports as large a share of its output as is the average for all food industries in the 
industrial country, OECD bloc. The fats and oils industry stands out as the export leader 
in the U.S. Of all of the industry groupings shown, this one produces the most 
homogeneous products, led by soybean oil. This suggests that U.S. food processors may 
be most export-oriented for the less differentiated, more commodity-like products, an 
observation that is supported by some of the subsequent analysis. 
A commonly-used measure of product differentiation is the extent to which a product 
is advertised. In essence, heavily advertised products are viewed as less homogeneous; the 
most important purpose of advertising being to create a unique image of and demand for 
the advertised product. Based on data from a panel of leading U.S. food processing firms, 
it appears that those who sell less advertised (more homogeneous) products have a higher 
propensity for product exports than do firms with heavily advertised goods (Table 7), that 
is, for firms that are light rather than heavy advertisers exports account for a significantly 
higher share of total shipments from U.S. plants. 
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Table 6. Exports by U.S. Food Processing Industries, 1988 
Industry 
Fats and Oils 
Grain Products 
Meat Products 
Sugar and Confections 
Preserved Fruits and Vegetables 
Beverages 
Dairy Products 
Bakery Products 
Source: [6] 
Exports as a Share 
of Total Shipments 
Percent 
18.8 
7.1 
5.2 
3.5 
3.0 
1.2 
1.1 
0.3 
Table 7. Foreign Market Performance of Leading U.S. Food Processors 
Exports as a Share of Shipments 
From U.S. Plants 
Exports as a Share of Total 
Foreign Sales 
Shipments from Foreign Plants as 
a Share of Worldwide Sales 
Heavy 
Advertisers" 
1.9 
27.9 
18.0 
Percent 
• Expenditures on media advertising equal to 1 percent of sales or more 
b Expenditures on media advertising less than 1 percent of sales 
Source: sample data 
Light 
Advertisersb 
4.7 
73.9 
4.4 
Further, firms selling less advertised, more homogeneous products depend more 
heavily on domestic production to supply international markets, whereas highly 
differentiated products tend to be supplied to foreign markets primarily from foreign plants. 
That is, U.S. producers of differentiated high-value agricultural products have a strong 
propensity to invest in foreign processing plants and a low propensity to export such 
products from the U.S. While we do not yet have sufficient information on non-U.S. food 
processing firms to determine if foreign frrms behave in the same manner, the earlier 
observation that U.S. firms in general are less export oriented than are their competitors 
in other industrial countries suggests that the low export propensity by U.S. producers of 
highly differentiated products may be a uniquely American phenomenon. 
17 
It also appears that larger firms tend to export less and invest in foreign production 
facilities more than do smaller firms (Table 8). The value of exports as a share of total 
sales of food products by all firms that are involved in food processing averages more than 
three times larger than the export share for the 10 largest U.S. food processing firms. By 
contrast, the largest firms source a substantially larger share of their total worldwide food 
sales from plants that they own in foreign countries. Thus, export propensity for U.S. 
producers of high-value products ~ppears to be inversely related to firm size. 
Table 8. Shipments by U.S. Food Processors* 
Exports from 
U.S. Plants 
Shipments from 
Foreign Plants 
Percent of Total Food Sales 
All Food Processing Firms 
64 Leading Firms 
10 Largest Firms 
Source: (6] and sample data 
4.7 
2.2 
1.6 
9.7 
20.0 
22.9 
Export performance also appears to be a function of the extent to which a firm 
specializes in the food business (Table 9). Exports account for nearly twice the share of 
total shipments from U.S. plants for firms that are exclusively in the food business 
compared to firms where food accounts for less than two-thirds of total sales. Likewise, 
exports make up a significantly larger share of non-U.S. food sales for the former. 
Table 9. Exports by Leading U.S. Food Processing Firms 
Specialized 
Food Firms• 
Diversified 
Product Firmsb 
Percent 
Exports as a Share of Food 
Shipments from U.S. Plants 
Exports from the U.S. as a Share 
of Total Foreign Food Sales 
3.4 
61.5 
• Food products account for 100 percent of total sales 
b Food products account for less than two-thirds of total sales 
Source: sample data 
1.8 
46.0 
Interestingly, food processing firms organized as farmer cooperatives appear to be more 
aggressive exporters than are investor-owned firms (Table 10). Exports as a share of total 
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shipments from domestic plants are roughly twice as great for the former. Arguably this 
reflects the primary orientation of farmer cooperatives toward expanding the market for 
their member-owner products as contrasted to the return-on-investment motivation typical 
of investor-owned firms. 
Table 10. Exports by Cooperative and Investor-Owned Food Processing Firms 
Investor-Owned Corporations 
Farmer-Owned Cooperatives 
Source: sample data 
Exports as a Share of Food 
Shipments from U.S. Plants 
Percent 
1.9 
3.9 
Using regression analysis, the relationship between a number of structural and 
behavioral variables and export propensity in the U.S. food processing industries was 
estimated (Table 11). Export propensity is defined as: exports as a share of total 
shipments from U.S. plants. Product transportability, concentration of sellers in the 
industry, the share of a firm's labor force employed in non-production jobs, and the firm's 
capital to sales ratio are positively related to export propensity while the other variables 
examined exhibit an inverse relationship. Overall, variation in the nine factors studied 
explained 38 percent of the variation in export propensities among the 41 food processing 
industries included in the analysis. 
Some of these relationships are logically obvious and need no elaboration. An 
example is the positive relationship with product transportability and the inverse 
relationships with wage rates and height of trade barriers. The inverse relationship between 
export propensity and advertising intensity tends to confirm the earlier observations 
concerning product differentiation. Product differentiation also may explain the inverse 
connection between exports and research and development. That is, to the extend R&D 
is used to create differentiated products, this relationship is consistent with the view that 
U.S. food firms are less aggressive exporters of differentiated than homogeneous goods. 
The positive relation of seller concentration, non-production workers, and capital 
investment to export performance are particularly interesting. Seller concentration implies 
that the leading firms have captured a significant share of the domestic market--apparently 
this same expertise is being used to gain a foothold in export markets. Non-production 
workers include sales and marketing personnel, suggesting that as a firm puts more relative 
emphasis on such functions, benefits may be realized in export markets. Finally, the 
positive correlation between capital investment and exports suggests that U.S. food firms 
may have a relative advantage in export markets for goods that are capital intensive, that 
is, that require relatively large amounts of capital, compared to labor, to produce. 
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Table 11. Factors Related to Export Propensity in Food Processing Industries• 
Factor 
Product Transportability 
Seller Concentration 
Non-production Workers as a Share of Labor Force 
Total Capital Investment per Dollar of Sales 
Index of World Food Trade Barriers 
Percent Change in Export Propensity 
Associated with a 10 Percent Increase 
in Factor Value 
Percent 
+10.4 
+ 6.6 
+ 3.4 
+ 3.1 
- 0.7 
Research and Development Spending as a Share of Sales 
Advertising Expenditures as a Share of Sales 
-2.0 
- 4.8 
Share of Commodity Input Contracted 
Hourly Wage Rate 
R2 
• 1982 data from 41 4-digit SIC food processing industries 
Source: based on [7) 
-13 
-26.0 
0.38 
Overall, therefore, it appears the U.S. food processing industries are less competitive 
in export markets than are similar industries in other advanced countries. Yet, there are 
a number of characteristics that seem to be associated with those firms and industries within 
the U.S. that are above average in terms of export performance. As specific import markets 
for high-value agricultural products in the Pacific Rim countries are identified in the 
following section, it is important to reflect on the structure and behavior of the domestic 
industry that are actual or potential suppliers to those markets. The key is to identify those 
high potential import markets where U.S. industry demonstrates a large number of the 
above characteristics that are important determinants of export competitiveness. 
High-Value Product Trade in the Pacific Rim 
For the purposes herein, the Pacific Rim (PacRim) is defmed as those countries 
making up the regions generally known as East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and 
Oceania. Countries in each of these regions for which trade data on high-value products 
were available are detailed in Table 12. All observations for the PacRim in total are sums 
of the related data for each of these 26 countries. Each country was then analyzed on a 
product-by-product basis and specific country /product combinations were singled out for 
more detailed analysis on the basis of a set of decision rules (detailed below). 
The Pacific Rim is a particularly important region for exports of U.S. high-value 
products (Table 13). This region accounts for 37 percent of the value of all U.S. 
agricultural export shipments but 42 percent of the U.S. shipments of high-value products. 
Likewise, whereas high-value products make up less than 49 percent of all U.S. agricultural 
exports, they account for 55 percent of all shipments to PacRim countries. 
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Table 12. Pacific Rim Countries 
East Asia 
China 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Macao 
Mongolia 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
South Asia 
Afghanistan 
India 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Southeast Asia 
Brunei 
Burma 
Cambodia 
Indonesia 
Laos 
Oceania 
American Samoa 
Australia 
New Caldonia 
New Zealand 
Papua New Guinea 
Table 13. U.S. Agricultural Exports to the Pacific Rim, 1987 
Exports to the Pacific Rim 
All Agricultural Products 
High-Value Products 
Exports of High-Value Products 
To All Markets 
To the Pacific Rim 
Share of Total U.S. 
Agricultural Exports 
37.1% 
42.1% 
48.7% 
55.2% 
Sources of trade data used in this analysis include the "Crops, Livestock and Fishery 
Products" (CLF) domain from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) [4], and "Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States" (FATUS) [2] from the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. The CLF data include annual quantities (metric tons) and 
values (US dollars) of imports and exports by product category for about 250 countries, 
including those in Table 12. FA TUS includes similar quantity and value data by product 
category and country of destination and origin for U.S. exports and imports, respectively. 
However, the product categorization schemes are dissimilar. Because the FATUS 
designations allow calculation of the U.S. share of each country's imports, they were used 
as the primary product classifications. The CLF data were then partitioned into the most 
similar FATUS product categories, generating more than 50 distinct product groups. Table 
14 contains a list of these product groupings and the value of Pacific Rim imports in 1987. 
Total value of these items imported to the Pacific Rim countries in 1987 was approximately 
$26 billion. · 
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With more than 50 product categories and 26 countries, the number of potential 
country /product combinations exceeds 1,300. The sheer magnitude mandates some 
selection process in order to limit the number of markets for detailed analysis to a 
manageable number. Thus, somewhat arbitrary selection rules were imposed. The intent 
was to select only those markets that account for the most significant shares of the region's 
high-value product imports or that have demonstrated above-average rates of growth. For 
purposes _herein, these are considered to be "high potential" markets for U.S. exports. · 
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Table 14. Total Value of Pacific Rim Imports By Product Category, 1987 (Part 1) 
LIVE ANIMALS INCLUDING PQl!LTRY ($mil.) 
Live Animals 352 
Live Poultry 112 
MEATS 
Beef and Veal 495 
Pork 1,504 
Poultry 490 
Variety Meats 495 
Other Meats Fresh or Frozen 333 
EQQS and DAIRY PRQDl!CfS 
Eggs 103 
Evaporated and Condensed Milk 519 
Cheese 229 
FATS and OILS (animal j!nd v~getj!ble) 
Tallow 25 
Other Fats and Oils 29 
Soybean Oil 532 
Other Vegetable Oils and Waxes 2,406 
FRUIT, JUI~ES AND NUTS 
Citrus Fruits 606 
Apples 127 
Grapes 60 
Other Non-citrus Fruits 922 
Processed Fruits and Juice 577 
Nuts except Almonds and Peanuts 348 
· Peanuts 183 
Almonds 118 
HIDES and SKINSLFIBER PROD:UCI'S 
Cattle Hides 1,533 
Fur Skins 580 
Other Hides and Skins 285 
Wool and Mohair 2,205 
Cotton excluding Linters 29 
Cotton Linters 2,580 
Fibers excluding Cotton 609 
VEGETABLES 
Fresh Vegetables 328 
Frozen Potatoes 85 
Canned Vegetables 122 
Other Vegetables, prepared or preserved 107 
Pulses 339 
:fROCESSED QRAIN fRQDUCfS '137 
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Table 14. Total Value of Pacific Rim Imports By Product Category, 1987 (Part 2) 
SWEETENERS. CONFECfiONERY. SPICES and BEVERAGES 
Sugar and Related Products 
Coffee 
Cocoa 
"Chocolate 
Tea and Mate 
Spices 
Beverages, excluding juices 
Wme 
MANQFACfURED TOBACCO PRODUCTS 
Source: [4) 
($mil.) 
1,600 
988 
224 
209 
334 
298 
793 
185 
1,100 
Within each product category, countries were selected for specific analysis if: (1) 
the quantity of high-value imports from all sources in 1987 exceeded the average for all 
PacRim countries (Table 15: high-volume test), m: (2) the rates of growth in the quantity 
of high-value imports in both the short run (5 years, 1982 through 1987) and the long run 
(25 years, 1962 through 1987) equaled or exceeded the simple average growth rates for the 
entire region (Table 16: rapid growth test). 
Note that four countries meet both sets of criteria: India, Pakistan, S. Korea, and 
Singapore. These are both high volume and high growth markets. Additionally, Japan, 
Hong Kong, China, and Malaysia meet the high-volume criterion; Brunei and Taiwan meet 
the rapid growth criterion. All told, 10 countries pass the high potential market test for 
high-value product imports in total. 
Table 15. High Volume Import Markets in the Pacific Rim, 1987 
Country 
Japan 
India 
Hong Kong 
China 
S. Korea 
Pakistan 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Pacific Rim Average, All Countries 
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Imports 
(Mil. Metric Tons) . 
8.60 
3.61 
3.51 
3.12 
2.45 
2.11 
1.81 
1.71 
1.23 
Table 16. Rapid-Growth Import Markets in the Pacific Rim, 1987 
Country 
India 
Pakistan 
S. Korea 
Singapore 
Brunei 
Taiwan 
Pacific Rim Average, All Countries 
Average Annua1 Growth Rate 
1962 - 1987 1982 - 1987 
Percent 
18.9 23.0 
43.4 17.4 
61.3 8.8 
12.6 7.4 
33.9 7.0 
44.2 4.0 
9.6 4.0 
Another decision rule was imposed in selecting specific high-value products to be 
analyzed in each of the identified countries. In keeping with the "above average" concept, 
products were selected on the basis of the their import value. That is, products were 
selected if they bad an import value (1987 basis) in any of the 10 countries that exceeded 
the average value for all high-value imports into the same country. Thus, the following 
discussion is limited to those product/ country combinations where imports of high-value 
products are above-average when compared to all possible product and country 
combinations within the Pacific Rim. All told, 356 specific product/ country combinations 
were identified as high potential import markets. 
The discussion of high potential markets is organized by general product categories. 
Within each such category, the total value of imports from all sources in 1987, measured 
in U.S. dollars as reported in CLF, is shown for each specific product that met the above-
average selection rule in at least one country. Then, for each such country, its share of 
total PacRim imports of each product class is calculated, followed by the product class is 
share of total high-value imports by that country. This provides a representation of the 
relative importance of each identified product/ country combination in terms of overall 
import activity. 
Following this, the importance of the U.S. as a supplier to these high potential 
markets is identified. Using FATUS data, the share of total imports for the product class 
that originates from the U.S. is calculated, along with the country's share of total U.S. 
exports and its share of U.S. exports to the Pacific Rim region. 
In essence, where the U.S. share of an identified high potential product/ country 
import market is low, and/or where the identified market accounts for a small share of 
both total U.S. exports and U.S. exports to the PacRim, we suggest that the U.S. is less 
than fully competitive as an import supplier. But, because such markets meet the "high 
potential" tests, they are viewed as potentially lucrative opportunities for new export 
initiatives. By contrast, identified markets where the U.S. already has a strong presence 
are considered to be well-developed export markets with a demonstrated U.S. competitive 
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advantage. The latter are markets where further exploitation of U.S. competitive 
advantages may be warranted whereas the former would appear to demand the 
development of new competitive strategies. 
Finally, import volume growth trends are shown for each of the identified high 
potential product/ country combinations. These are compound average annual rates of 
change over the short term (1982- 1987) and long term {1962- 1987), based on CLF data. 
High rates of growth in both the short and long terms, all else accounted for, are viewed 
as indicators of markets with the greatest potential pay-off from additional market 
development efforts. 
Live Animals 
Total live animals (except poultry) imports to the Pacific Rim countries were valued 
at $352 million in 1987, accounting for 1.3 percent of all high-value product (HVP) imports 
into the region. The long term (1962-1987) compound average annual growth in volume 
of live animal imports into the region was + 4 percent while the more recent short term 
{1982-1987) rate fell to -1 percent. Detail on the identified high potential product/country 
markets, cattle and pigs in Hong Kong and pigs in Malaysia, is presented in Table 17, along 
with indicators of U.S. performance in those markets. 
Hong Kong and Malaysia do not reflect the trend evident in the Pacific Rim as a 
whole. During the period 1962-1987 these countries had compound average annual rates 
of growth of -1 percent and +2 percent, respectively. For the period 1982-1987 Hong 
Kong had a growth rate of + 4 percent and Malaysia + 1 percent. 
. Hong Kong is a major import market for live animals, accounting for nearly 60 
percent of all Pacific Rim imports. Pigs constitute the single most important product, 88 
percent of the live animal total. The U.S. has a very low penetration of this market, less 
than 1 percent. By contrast, the U.S. has a much larger share, 5.3 percent, of the smaller 
Malaysian live animal market, which is predominantly cattle. If the U.S. could expand its 
share of the Hong Kong market just enough to equal its share in Malaysia, additional sales 
would be roughly $11 million (1987 dollars). 
Total live poultry imports to the PacRim were valued at $112 million in 1987, about 
0.4 percent of the region's HVP imports. Details on the high potential import markets are 
presented in Table 18, along with data on the performance of the U.S. in those markets. 
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Table 17. Live Animal (except Poultry) Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports 
Cattle ($ mil) 
Pigs ($mil) 
Total Live Animal Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) 
U.S. Live Animal Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports (%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
Hong Kong Malaysia 
24 8.5 
179 • 
59 3.3 
7 1.3 
<1 5.3 
<1 <1 
<1 1.8 
-1 -2 
4 1 
The PacRim import growth rate for live poultry from 1962 to 1987 was 11 percent 
and from 1982 to 1987, 7 percent. This indicates some slowdown in the expansion of the 
market. Hong Kong, however, exhibited a steady 10 percent growth rate for both periods 
while Malaysia had annual declines in the 5 to 6 percent range. 
Table 18. Live Poultry Import Markets 
Total Imports 
Poultry ($ mil) 
Total Live Poultry Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports (%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Live Poultry Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
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Hong Kong Malaysia 
68 6 
71 5.7 
2.6 <1 
<1 7 
<1 <1 
<1 1.8 
10 -5 
10 -6 
Hong Kong is the major import market for live poultry, accounting for nearly 71 
percent of all PacRim imports. However, the U.S. penetration of the Malaysian market 
at 7 percent is significantly greater than its 1 percent of Hong Kong imports. If the U.S. 
achieved the same share of the steadily growing Hong Kong market as it has in Malaysia, 
additional U.S. live poultry exports would be approximately $14.5 million (1987 dollars). 
Meats 
Meat imports into the PacRim were valued at approximately $3.3 billion in 1987, 
a significant 12.6 percent of all HVP import purchases. Meat imports can be divided into 
five categories based on available data: beef and veal, pork, poultry meats, variety meats, 
and other fresh or frozen meats. A number of specific products can be identified within 
several of these categories. 
Total beef and veal imports were valued at $495 million in 1987, accounting for 
roughly 16 percent of all meat in-flows. Details on the identified high potential import 
markets are presented in Table 19, including information on the performance of the U.S. 
in those markets. 
Table 19. Beef and Veal Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports Hong Kong Taiwan Brunei Malaysia 
Beef Preparations ($mil) a a 1.8 a 
Beef and Veal ($mil) a 90 1.5 a 
Beef and Veal; Boneless ($mil) 62 a a 37 
Total Beef and Veal Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 34.6 26.4 1.3 14.7 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 2.9 4.7 2.8 4 
U.S. Beef and Veal Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 12.3 9.8 <1 2.1 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 1.4 1.1 <1 <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 1.8 1.5 <1 <1 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 4 10 -3 15 
1982-1987 7 b 9 14 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests . 
b No volume data were reported for 1962; 1972-1987 compound annual rate of growth was 14.7% 
The long-term rate of growth in the volume of beef and veal imported to the 
PacRim was 11 percent. However, more recently the short-run growth rate declined to 3 
percent. 
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Taiwan a~d Hong Kong, followed by Malaysia, are the major importers of beef and 
veal products that met the high potential market tests. All three have shown continuing 
growth. By contrast, the import market in Brunei declined by about 3 percent per year over 
the 1962-1987 period. But, the rate of growth in Brunei over the last five years is + 9 
percent. Brunei is currently a small market where the U.S. has a very small market share. 
But because it meets the high potential market tests and has demonstrated rapid growth in 
recent years, it may be a market worthy of some targeted development activity. 
Approximately 15 percent of the .PacRim beef and veal imports go to Malaysia. 
The U.S. holds only a 2 percent market share, but this country has the most rapidly 
expanding import market of those studied. 
Perhaps the PacRim market that has generated the most interest is Japan. Japan, 
although accounting for 46 percent of all Pacific Rim beef and veal imports and 
representing the largest dollar import volume in 1987 at $116 million, did not meet the 
high potential market test because these products are relatively minor when compared to 
other Japanese HVP imports; that is, the 1987 beef and veal import value was below the 
average for all high value product imports. 
Pork imports by Pacific Rim countries were valued at $1,504 million in 1987, about 
half of all meat imports and about 6 percent of all PacRim HVP purchases. Details on the 
identified high potential markets are shown in Table 20. 
Table 20. Pork Import Markets 
Total Imports 
Pigmeat ($ mil) 
Total Pork Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Pork Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports (%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
Japan Hong Kong 
142 88 
92.8 6.9 
10 3.5 
6.4 1.1 
71.4 <1 
91.5 1.3 
15 4 
40 11 
The compound average annual rate of growth in the volume of pork imported to 
the PacRim between 1962 and 1987 was 18 percent; but in the 1982-1987 period declined 
to 12 percent. Japan dominates this market with 93 percent of the region's imports. Pork 
imports to Japan have risen at a phenomenal average annual growth rate of 40 percent 
during the most recent 5 year period. The U.S. has a relatively small share of the Japanese 
market, approximately 6.5 percent, but this accounts for 71 percent of all U.S. pork exports. 
U.S. sales to Japan were valued at $92 million in 1987. Given the size of the import 
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market and the relatively small share currently held by the U.S., it appears that there is 
considerable room for expanding U.S. pork exports to Japan. 
PacRim imports of poultry meats were valued at $490 million in 1987, approximately 
2 percent of all HVP imports to the region. High potential markets are detailed in Table 
21. 
The volume of poultry meat imports during the period 1962-1987 grew at an average 
annual rate of approximately 7 percent, rising to an 11 percent rate during the more recent 
1982-1987 period. All four identified countries have experienced similar trends toward 
increasing growth rates. Poultry meat imports are dominated by chicken meat. 
Table 21. Poultry Meat Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports Hong Kong hrum Brunei Malaysia 
Chicken Meat ($ mil) 97 324 1.5 6 
Duck Meat ($mil) a • 9.5 • 
Total Poultry Meats Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 20.6 73 2.3 1.2 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) 3.4 2.5 9.4 <1 
U.S. Poultry Meats Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports (%) 57.2 26.6 6 9.3 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 14.3 23.6 <1 <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 31.6 52 <1 <1 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 7 14 25 -2 
1982-1987 12 30 29 11 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
Approximately 94 percent of the PacRim poultry meat imports go to Japan and 
Hong Kong--about 72 percent to Japan alone. During the recent 1982-1987 period, both 
Japan and Brunei exhibited a growth rates approaching 30 percent. Based on sheer size, 
Japan probably offers the more attractive opportunity for expansion. The U.S. has achieved 
a relatively high market share in Japan, about 27 percent, valued at $95 million in 1987. 
Brunei is a small but rapidly growing market, particularly for duck. While not considered 
a major export product for the U.S., the U.S. appears to have had reasonable success in 
selling duck into this market and it may offer interesting possibilities as an international 
"niche" market for further development. 
Total variety meats imports were valued at $495 million in 1987, or roughly 2 percent 
of all HVP imports into the region. Details on the identified high potential import markets 
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for specific variety meat products are presented in Table 22, along with indicators of U.S. 
performance in those markets. 
Table 22. Variety Meat Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports 
Offals of Cattle, Edible 
Offals other cattle 
Other Prepared Meats 
Total Variety Meats Imports 
($mil) 
($mil) 
($mil) 
Hon~ Kon~ 
• 
• 
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Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 4 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) <1 
U.S. Variety Meats Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 11.4 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 1.6 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 3 
1982-1987 6 
• Does not meet the high potential import markets tests 
hnm Malaysia 
404 • 
• 7 
• • 
90.6 5 
3.2 2.7 
31.9 1.7 
41.2 <1 
97.3 <1 
12 -2 
29 8 
The compound average annual rate of growth in volume of variety meats imports 
over the long-term, 1962-1987 period was about 13 percent and in the short-term, 1982-
1987 period slowed to approximately 8 percent. Exports of edible cattle offals to Japan 
are the largest single item in this category. Japanese imports grew at a 29 percent annual 
rate during the most recent 5 years studied. The U.S. has a significant 32 percent share of 
the Japanese market and this market accounts for nearly all of the U.S. shipments into the 
region. 
Total imports to the Pacific Rim countries of other fresh or frozen meats were valued 
at $333 million in 1987, equal to about 11 percent of all meat imports. Details on the high 
potential import markets for this class of products are presented in Table 23, along with 
indicators of U.S. performance in those markets. 
The annual rate of growth in PacRim import volume during the 1962-1987 period 
was 5 percent and during the more recent 1982-1987 period, -1 percent. Japan was the 
dominant importer of mutton and lamb, the only product class in the other meat category 
that met the "above average" test. Contrary to PacRim trends, Japanese imports have 
expanded in recent years. Taiwan and Malaysia are considerably smaller markets but 
exhibit long term growth trends. The U.S. has unimpressive shares of these markets even 
though Japan alone accounts for nearly 20 percent of all U.S.exports in this product 
category. 
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Table 23. Other Fresh or Frozen :Meat Import Markets 
Total Imports Japan Taiwan Malaysia 
Mutton and Lamb ($ mil) 130 U.4 10 
Total Other Meats Fresh or Frozen Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 73.2 4.1 3.5 
·Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 1.7 <1 1.3 
U.S. Other Meats Fresh or Frozen Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 2.9 1.3 <1 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 18.9 <1 <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 67.5 1.7 <1 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 -5 13 20 
1982-1987 5 a 6 
• No volume data were available for 1982 
Eggs and Dairy Products 
Egg and dairy product imports into the Pacific Rim were valued at approximately 
$851 million in 1987, about 3 percent of all HVP import purchases. This category is divided 
into three categories eggs, evaporated and condensed milk, and cheese. 
Total egg imports to the Pacific Rim countries were valued at $103 million in 1987, 
just 0.4 percent of all HVP in-bound trade. Only one high potential market for Table eggs 
was identified. This is detailed in Table 24. 
The average annual rate of growth in the volume of eggs imported into Pacific 
Rim countries over the longer term, 1962-1987 period was approximately 4 percent. This 
slowed to just 1 percent from 1982 to 1987. Hong Kong and Japan account for 95 percent 
of the PacRim egg imports, but the former is the dominant importer. Eggs do not meet the 
"above average" HVP import product test in Japan. The U.S. has only a small market share 
in Hong Kong, with that country accounting for a significantly smaller share of U.S. 
shipments to the PacRim than its share of total PacRim imports. Thus the opportunity 
would appear to exist for the U.S. to appreciably increase its share of the Hong Kong 
market. 
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Table 24. Egg Import Markets 
Total Imports 
Eggs ($mil) 
Total Egg Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) 
U.S. Egg Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
Hong Kong 
71 
71 
2.4 
83 
6.8 
17.6 
4 
3 
The region's imports of evaporated and condensed milk in 1987 totaled $519 million, 
or about 2 percent of all HVP imports. Details on the identified high potential import 
markets for specific products within this category are presented in Table 25. 
The growth in volume imported to the region averaged 3 percent per year between 
1962 and 1987 but declined to a 1 percent average during the latter 5-year period. While 
all four countries shown in the Table have sizeable imports, the U.S. has a negligible 
market share. Further, China, India, and Pakistan all have significant imports in this 
category but FATUS indicates that the U.S. has no shipments to those countries. Overall, 
these product markets appear to be ones that the U.S. has largely left untapped in the 
Pacific Rim. 
33 
Table 25. Evaporated and Condensed Milk Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports Hong Kong Japan Taiwan Mala~sia 
Dry Skim Cow Milk ($mil) • 78.6 153 94 
Dry Whole Cow Milk ($mil) 45 • • • 
Total Evaporated and Condensed Milk.Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 14.2 17.5 29.8 18.3 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 2.4 <1 8 10.3 
U.S. Evaporated and Condensed Milk Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) <1 <1 <1 1 
Share of Total U.S. Exports (%) 4.3 <1 8.3 46.7 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 7.2 <1 13.9 78.5 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 5 0 5 6 
1982-1987 4 3 13 1 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
Total PacRim cheese imports in 1987 were valued at $229 million, just slightly less 
than 1 percent of all HVP purchases. Import markets that met the high potential tests 
are detailed in Table 26, along with information on the performance of the U.S. in those 
markets. 
Table 26. Cheese Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports 
Ghee (from cow milk) 
Cheese (whole cow milk) 
Total Cheese Imports 
($mil) 
($mil) 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports (%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) 
U.S. Cheese Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
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Japan Pakistan 
• 6.6 
170 • 
74 2.9 
1.2 <1 
3 2 
14.7 <1 
83.8 2.3 
5 13 
13 24 
For the entire region, the compound average annual rate of growth in the volume 
of cheese imports between 1962 and 1987 was a rapid 12 percent. However, this slowed 
to around 4 percent during the last five years of this period. Japan is the dominant buyer 
in the Pacific Rim and accounts for most of the U.S. cheese shipments to the region. 
However, the U.S. holds only 3 percent of this very significant and rapidly expanding 
market. India and Malaysia each comprise a sizeable portion of the import market in the 
PacRim, with 8 percent and 7 percent of total imports, respectively. But, the U.S. does 
not report export quantities to these markets. 
Fats and Oils 
Total fats and oils imports into the Pacific Rim were valued at $2,992 million in 
1987. This accounts for a significant 11.4 percent of all HVP import purchases. Fats and 
oils are divided into four categories: soybean oil, tallow, other vegetable oils and waxes, and 
other fats and oils. Several products can be identified under each product category. 
Total imports of soybean oil into the· Pacific Rim counties in 1987 were valued at 
$532 million, just over 2 percent of all HVP in-shipments. Details on the identified high 
potential import markets in the region are presented in Table 27, along with indicators of 
U.S. performance in these markets. 
Table 27. Soybean Oil Import Markets 
Total Imports India Pakistan Malaysia Singapore China 
Soybean Oil ($ mil) 463 99 35 50 143 
Total Soybean Oil Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 58.2 18.5 6.6 9.4 27 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 31.6 12.5 3.8 6 9 
U.S. Soybean Oil Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 6.6 88 • <1 • 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 25.9 33 • <1 • 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 31.6 73.5 • <1 • 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 -3 -8 100 43 58 
1982-1987 27 13 35 40 34 
• No U.S. exports reported by FATUS 
For the entire PacRim region the average annual rate of growth in the volume of 
soybean oil imports was 14 percent between 1962 and 1987. The growth rate slipped to 
about 6 percent during the last five years of this period. India is the region's leading 
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importer. However, the U.S. ships only 7 percent of the soy oil imported by India in 
comparison with its 88 percent share of the smaller Pakistanian market. These two 
countries represent nearly all U.S. soy oil shipments to the region despite the presence of 
several other major importing countries. There may be a considerable opportunity for the 
U.S. to increase export sales to these latter countries. 
In terms of total import val~e within the general fats and oils classification, vegetable 
oils and waxes other than soybean oil is the largest single product group. PacRim imports 
in 1987 were valued at $2.4 billion, more than 9 percent of all high-value product imports 
into the region. The identified high potential import markets for this group of products are 
detailed in Table 28. 
For the entire region, imports during the 1962-1987 period grew at an average 
annual rate of 11 percent and growth remained fairly steady during the last five years of 
the period at about 10 percent. Most of the high potential markets, however, have achieved 
a markedly higher rate of growth in recent years, averaging in the 14-15 percent range for 
China, Japan, India, and Pakistan and reaching a high of 26 percent per year in South 
Korea. The specific products imported vary widely among the countries, however, with 
rapeseed oil leading the way in India, crude organic materials pacing imports in China, and 
corn oil topping the list in Japan. Thus, this appears to be an area where careful targeting 
of specific products to specific countries may be a viable export strategy. The U.S. has only 
small shares of these markets, nowhere supplying as much as 10 percent of the imports. 
In the two largest corn oil import markets, Japan and Singapore, the U.S. has less than a 
3 percent market share and these markets combined account for little more than 10 percent 
of U.S. corn oil exports. These would seem to be likely markets for additional export 
targeting by U.S. suppliers. 
36 
Table 28. Import Markets for Vegetable Oils and Waxes (except Soybean Oil), Part 1 
Significant Products: Total Imports China lwn S. Korea Hon~ Kong 
Oil of Coconuts ($mil) 17 • a • 
Rapeseed Oil ($mil) • • • 32 
Groundnut Oil ($mil) • • • 27 
Crude Organic Materials ($mil) 116 • 58 • 
Com Oil ($mil) • 94 • • 
Linseed Oil ($mil) 11 • • • 
Total Vegetable Oils and Waxes Imports, except Soybean Oil 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 6.6 42.9 3.5 3.7 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 9.8 13 3.5 2.9 
U.S. Vegetable Oils and Waxes Exports, except Soybean Oil 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) <1 2.3 10.9 11.2 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) <1 8.7 3.4 3.6 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) <1 42.5 16.5 17.4 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
b 1962-1987 36 12 12 
1982-1987 14 14 26 8 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
b No volume data were available for 1962 
Table 28. Import Markets for Vegetable Oils and Waxes (except Soybean Oil), Part 2 
Significant Products: Total Imports India Pakistan Malaysia Sin~apore 
Oil of Coconuts ($mil) • • • 10.7 
Hydrogenated Oils ($mil) • 8.6 • • 
Rapeseed Oil ($mil) 250 8.4 • 25.6 
Corn Oil ($mil) • • • 18.6 
Other Vegetable Oils ($mil) • • 8 • 
Total Vegetable Oils and Waxes Imports, except Soybean Oil 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 23 6.2 <1 12.1 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) 37.7 18.9 2.5 34.9 
U.S. Vegetable Oils and Waxes Exports, except Soybean Oil 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) <1 <1 6.5 1.5 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) <1 <1 <1 1.6 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) <1 <1 2.7 7.8 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 16 13 27 5 
1982-1987 15 15 5 11 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
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Tallow is a minor import in the Pacific Rim, valued at only $21 million in 1987. 
However, the U.S. has a significant share of the high potential markets (Table 29). 
Table 29. Tallow Import Markets 
Total Imports 
Tallow ($mil) 
Total Tallow Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Tallow Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports (%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
• Data for 1982 were unavailable 
S. Korea 
42 
28.8 
1.7 
57.6 
6.6 
39.6 
-2 
9 
Taiwan Pakistan 
24 32 
16.4 21.9 
1.2 4 
18.3 64 
1.2 5.6 
7.2 33.5 
1 1 
• 8 
The compound average annual rate of growth in tallow import volume in the region 
during the 1962-1987 period was about 7 percent. During the last five years the rate 
declined to -2 percent. The U.S. has a dominant share of the markets in South Korea and 
Pakistan, both markets that are expanding contrary to regional trends. The U.S. share of 
the Taiwanese market trails sharply behind the two other identified high potential markets, 
suggesting that there may be opportunity for a substantial expansion of the U.S. presence 
in this country. 
Pacific Rim imports of other fats and oils not elsewhere classified in 1987 were 
valued at $29 million. For this product category, only one market met the tests as a high 
potential opportunity -- fatty acid imports into Pakistan. Details are presented in Table 30. 
The compound average annual rate of growth in the volume of fatty acid imports in 
the region was 5 percent in the 1962 to 1987 period, but declined to about 2 percent during 
the last 5 years. Pakistan has registered more pronounced rates of growth and appears to 
be the most significant PacRim market. Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are 
minor buyers on world markets. The U.S. is not a factor is these markets. 
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Table 30. Import Markets for Other Fats and Oils (not elsewhere classified) 
Total Imports 
Fatty Acids ($mil) 
Total Other Fats and Oils Nee. Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Other Fats and Oils Nee. Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
Fruits, Juices, and Nuts 
Pakistan 
6 
32.3 
1.2 
<1 
<1 
<1 
54 
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Nearly $3 billion in various fruits, juices, and nuts were purchased by Pacific Rim 
countries in 1987. As a group, these products made up more than 11 percent of all in-
bound shipments of high value products. 
The value of citrus fruit imports into Pacific Rim countries in 1987 totaled $606 
million, 2.3 percent of all HVP acquisitions and about 21 percent of all fruit, juice, and 
nut imports. The high potential markets for these products are identified in Table 31. 
Also included are performance data for U.S. citrus fruit exports into these markets. 
The compound annual rate of growth in the volume of citrus fruit imports into the 
Pacific Rim countries from 1962 to 1987 averaged 11 percent, declining somewhat during 
the last five years to about 7 percent. Japan is the major importer, accounting for two-
thirds of the region's total and is growing at an annual pace exceeding 20 percent. 
Grapefruit, oranges, lemons and limes are the predominant Japanese imports. The U.S. 
supplies a dominant, 65 percent share of Japanese imports. 
Oranges are the principal citrus imports into the other four high potential countries. 
However, the U.S. has a dominant share only in the more slowly expanding Hong Kong 
market. With fairly rapid growth in imports in Brunei and Malaysia, albeit from relatively 
low levels, these would appear to be markets where the U.S. presence could be expanded 
appreciably, perhaps through similar strategies that have been used with obvious success in 
Japan and Hong Kong. 
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Table 31. Citrus Fruit Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports Japan 
Oranges ($mil) 121.7 
Grapefruit and Pomelo ($mil) 152 
Tang.Mand.Clement.Satsma ($mil) • • 
Lemons and Limes ($mil) 118.6 
Total Citrus Fruit Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 64.7 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) 2.8 
U.S. Citrus Fruit Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 65.6 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 51.9 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 75.6 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
b No volume data were reported for 1987 
6 
21 
Hong Kong Brunei Malaysia Singapore 
92.4 2.4 29.8 34.9 
• • • • 
• • • 10.7 
• • • • 
18.9 <1 5 8 
3.8 2.2 3.4 5.8 
51.7 1.3 16 15.8 
12 <1 1 1.5 
17.4 <1 1.5 2.2 
4 7 14 b 
6 14 7 b 
PacRim apple imports totaled $127 million in 1987. Details on the high potential 
import markets in this region are included in Table 33. 
Table 33. Apple Import Markets 
Total Imports Hong Kong Taiwan Brunei Malaysia Singapore 
Apples ($mil) 36.8 39.4 2 19 28 
Total Apple Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 29.1 31 1.6 15 22.1 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports{%) 1.2 2 1.7 2 3.4 
U.S. Apple Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 36.7 42.8 <1 16.2 14.3 
Share of Total U.S. Exports (%) 14.1 17.5 <1 3.2 4.1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 36 44.8 <1 8.2 10.6 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 5 11 9 2 -5 
1982-1987 4 8 14 6 5 
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During the long-term 1962 to 1987 period, apple imports into the Pacific Rim region 
expanded at an average rate of 7 percent per year. This has declined nominally to about 
a 5 percent growth rate during the last 5 years. The most rapid growth has been registered 
in the small Brunei market, where U.S. presence is. minimal. By contrast, the U.S. has 
gained significant shares in Hong Kong and Taiwan, both relatively large markets. 
Substantial additional apple exports would be realized if the U.S. could achieve the same 
35-40 percent market shares in Malaysia and Singapore, both already reasonably sizable 
markets. 
Grape imports in the PacRim were valued at $60 million in 1987. Three countries 
meet the test for high potep.tial grape import markets. These are detailed in Table 34, along 
with U.S. market share data. 
Table 34. Grape Import Markets 
Total Imports Hong Kong Malaysia Singapore 
Grapes ($mil) 21.9 6.2 14.6 
Total Grape Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports (%) 36.6 10.4 24.4 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) <1 <1 1.8 
U.S. Grape Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 50.4 19.2 28.7 
Share of Total U.S. Exports (%) 10.2 1.1 3.9 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 31.9 3.4 12.1 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 1 7 10 
1982-1987 6 3 5 
For the region as a whole, grape imports grew at an average annual rate of about 
8 percent between 1962 and 1987, but at only a 4 percent annual pace during the latter 5 
years of this period. More than 60 percent of the imports are purchased by Hong Kong 
and Singapore, and both markets show above-average rates of growth in recent years. The 
U.S. is also quite competitive in these two markets, with 50 percent and 29 percent market 
shares, respectively. FATUS data also indicate that the U.S. ships more than $11 million 
of grapes to Taiwan, but CLF data do not report any Taiwanese imports, thus it is not 
possible to assess the potential to expand U.S. presence in that market. 
PacRim imports of other non-citrus fruits in 1987 were valued at $922 million, more 
than 30 percent of all fruit, juice, and nut purchases. Details on the high potential import 
markets and on U.S. performance in those markets are presented in Table 35. 
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The compound annual rate of growth in the volume of other non-citrus fruits 
imported into the Pacific Rim countries during 1962-1987 was 7 percent but fell to 3 
percent between 1982 and 1987. Malaysia, Japan, and Brunei all show relatively high rates 
of growth in recent years. Banana imports to Japan are the largest single item in this 
category, 40 percent of the total. There appears to be sizable imports of fresh non-citrus 
fruits other than pears, but neither CLF nor FA TUS data allowed identification of specific 
products. 
Table 35. Import Markets for Other Fresh Non-Citrus Fruits 
Significant Products: Total Imports ~ Hong Kong Brunei Malaysia Singapore 
Pears ($mil) 29 1.3 7.6 19.1 
Other Non-Tropical Fruit ($mil) 113.7 28 • • 
Bananas ($mil) 370.5 • • • 
Other Tropical Fruit ($mil) • 20.8 a a 
Total Other Non-citrus Fruit Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports (%) 72.2 15.5 <1 2.1 3.2 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 4.7 4.7 2.6 2.1 3.5 
U.S. Other Non-citrus Fruit Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 11.3 15.4 <1 1.5 5.1 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 31.5 9.2 <1 <1 <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 71.2 20.9 <1 <1 1.4 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in 
Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 3 3 12 14 3 
1982-1987 10 6 8 11 4 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
Raisin imports of the Pacific Rim countries in 1987 were valued at $76 million. 
Pakistan was the only country where raisins passed the high potential import market tests, 
but the FATUS data indicated no Pakistanian imports from the U.S. Thus, no detailed 
data are provided for this product. 
Total imports of processed fruits and juices into the Pacific Rim were valued at $577 
million in 1987, amounting to about 20 percent of all imports in the general fruits, juices, 
and nuts grouping. Details on the identified high potential import markets are presented 
in Table 36. 
Imports of processed fruits and juices grew at an annual average rate of 9 percent 
between 1962 and 1987 and held to a nearly steady 8 percent growth rate in the latter, 
1982-1987 period. Both Taiwan and Japan have shown high rates of growth in recent years, 
and the U.S. has achieved respectable shares of these import markets. However, due to 
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the limits of available data, few specifics on the products contained in this category can be 
identified. 
Table 36. Import Markets for Processed Fruits and Juices 
Significant Products: Total Imports lwn Honi Koni Taiwan ~ Malaysia 
Fruit Juice ($mil) • • • 1.5 • 
Prepared Fruit ($mil) 260 41.7 12 2.3 10.7 
Total Processed Fruit and Juice Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 67.7 18.9 4.1 <1 2.7 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) 2.8 3.6 1.2 3.9 1.7 
U.S. Processed Fruit and Juice Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 20.8 13.8 36.3 1.4 13.9 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 19.5 3.6 2 <1 <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 69.1 12.8 7.3 <1 1.9 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in 
Import Vol. (%) 
1962-1987 7 4 30 -9 20 
1982-1987 13 5 28 b 4 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
b No volume data were available for 1982 
The total value of nuts (except almonds and peanuts) imported into the Pacific Rim 
countries in 1987 was $348 million. The identified high potential import markets within the 
region for these products are detailed in Table 37, along with performance data on the U.S. 
in these markets. 
The average annual rate of growth in the volume of PacRim imports during the 
period 1962-1987 was just 1 percent. But this jumped significantly to 13 percent during the 
latter 5 years. Thus, this would appear to be an important growth market at this point in 
time. 
Chestnut shipments to Japan in 1987 were valued at $68.2 million. This market 
has experienced accelerated growth over the most recent five years studied. The U.S. has 
about 12 percent of this market. Shipments of cashews to India and Singapore totaled 
approximately $54 million in 1987, with Singapore expanding and India contracting in recent 
years. The U.S. has a negligible share of Indian imports but at least a "foot in the door" 
in the Singapore market. Most nuts not elsewhere classified appear to be shipped to Hong 
Kong, where the U.S. has a detectable presence. However, available data do not allow 
identification of actual species. 
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Table 37. Import Markets for Nuts (except Almonds and Peanuts) 
Total Imports Japan Hong Kong India Singapore 
Chestnuts ($mil) 68.2 a a a 
Cashews ($mil) a • 35 18.8 
Other Nuts ($mil) • 50.9 a a 
Total Nuts except Almonds and Peanuts Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 49.7 21.4 11.6 9 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 1.2 2.5 2.8 3.7 
U.S. Nuts except Almonds and Peanuts Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 11.8 7.4 <1 6.4 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 11 3 <1 1.1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 61.4 16.6 <1 6 
Compound Average Annual Rates of Growth in Import Volume(%) 
1962-1987 5 9 48 19 
1982-1987 11 7 -5 8 
a Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
Imports of peanuts in 1987 were valued at $183 million. Three countries, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, met the tests as high potential peanut import markets. 
These are detailed in Table 38. 
Table 38. Peanut Import Markets 
Total Imports Hong Kong Malaysia Singapore 
Peanuts ($mil) 23 5.9 25.6 
Total Peanut Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 22.1 3.5 15 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 1.3 <1 3.3 
U.S. Peanut Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) <1 5.3 <1 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) <1 <1 <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 1.6 2.2 <1 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 -3 19 22 
1982-1987 6 1 7 
The compound annual growth in volume of PacRim peanut imports during the 
period 1962-1987 was 7 percent but declined to 5 percent during the period 1982-1987. 
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More than half of the Pacific Rim peanut imports go to Japan, but this product did not 
meet the "above average" HVP import test in that country. The U.S. has only a small, 5 
percent, market share in the slow-growing Malaysian market and barely detectable shares 
in the somewhat faster growing Hong Kong and Singapore markets. The latter two, in 
particular, would appear to offer opportunities for U.S. expansion. 
Almond imports into the Pacific Rim were valued at $118 million in 1987. Only 
one country was identified as a high potential import market, Japan (Table 39). 
The average annual rate of growth in the volume of almond imports in the PacRim 
between 1962 and 1987 was 7 percent. But, all of this growth occurred prior to 1982--
since then there has been no expansion in the region as a whole. Japan presents an 
exception to the regional pattern, however, showing a significant 12 percent average annual 
growth rate in recent years. This accounts for more than three-fourths of all U.S. shipments 
to the region and the U.S. has a very dominant, 78+ percent share of Japanese imports. 
Table 39. Almond Import Markets 
Total Imports 
Almonds ($ mil) 
Total Almond Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Almond Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1%2-1987 
1982-1987 
Hides, Skins, and Natural Fiber Products 
88.3 
75 
<1 
78.6 
14.9 
76.9 
4 
12 
This is the largest single category of high value product imports into the Pacific 
Rim countries, accounting for 30 percent of the total. Included are cattle hides, fur skins, 
wool and mohair, cotton, and other natural fibers. 
Imports of cattle hides by PacRim countries 1987 totalled $1.5 billion, about 19 
percent of all hides, skins, and fiber imports and nearly 6 percent of all HVP purchases in 
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international markets. Details on the high potential import markets for cattle hides, along 
with data on U.S. performance in these markets, are presented in Table 40. 
The region's average annual rate of growth in cattle hide import volume during the 
1962-1987 period was 4 percent, but during the last 5 years of this period, no growth was 
registered. Korea is a large and apparently rapidly growing market in which the U.S. 
appears to enjoy a substantial competitive advantage. Japan is also a sizable market, 
dominated by U.S. supplies, but i~ declining in volume probably as that country's leather 
goods industries get moved off-shore to other Asian countries with lower labor costs. The 
Taiwanese market has shown rapid growth in recent years, and again the U.S. is the 
dominant supplier. However, the U.S. share trails by roughly 15 percentage points that of 
Korea and Japan, suggesting that an opportunity may exist to gain an even greater share 
of this expanding market. New market possibilities would also appear to exist in Hong 
Kong, a small but fast-growing market where U.S. presence is low in comparison with other 
high potential markets for cattle hides. 
Table 40. Import Markets for Cattle Hides 
Significant Products: Total Imports Japan S. Korea Hong Kong Taiwan 
Hides, Wet Salted ($ mil) 
Hides, Dry Salted ($ mil) 
Total Cattle Hide Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Cattle Hide Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
443 
I 
28.9 
3.1 
75.6 
25.3 
303 
1962-1987 -14 
1982-1987 -1 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
• No volume data for 1982 
• 32.2 290.9 
764.4 • I 
49.9 2.1 19 
31.3 1 15 
75.7 18.6 60.1 
43.6 <1 13.2 
52.4 <1 15.8 
21 14 -2 
b 11 13 
Imports of fur skins in the Pacific Rim during 1987 were valued at $580 million, 
about 7.5 percent of the categorical total. There are three identified high potential import 
markets for these goods, which are detailed in Table 41. 
Fur skin imports have grown rapidly in recent years, up at an average annual rate 
of 20 percent in the 1982-1987 period and at a 15 percent rate in the longer term, 1962-
1987 period. The three identified markets, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, account for 
nearly all of the region's imports. The U.S. has a 5-7.5 percent share of these markets, 
and in total they absorb about 12 percent of U.S. fur skin exports. Hong Kong is the 
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largest and most .rapidly growing of these markets, followed closely by Korea. Given that 
these are sizable markets but only account for a small share of U.S. shipments, it is 
suggested that there may be a substantial pay-off from additional export marketing efforts 
targeted to Taiwan and South Korea. 
Table 41. Fur Skin Import Markets 
Total Imports 
Fur Skins ($ mil) 
Total Fur Skin Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports (%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Fur Skin Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
• No volume data for 1982 
~ 
119.8 
2il.7 
<1 
7.5 
3.2 
26.6 
-3 
3 
S. Korea Hon~: Kon~: 
197.3 2595 
34 44.8 
8 8.6 
55 5.1 
3.9 4.7 
32.2 39.1 
2i) 55 
• 26 
In 1987 the PacRim countries imported other hides and skins worth $285 million. 
Details on the identified high potential markets are presented in Table 42. 
During the most recent five years examined, annual growth in imports of other hides 
and skins averaged 7 percent in the region, up from the 25 year average of 4 percent. 
South Korea is a small but apparently fast-growing market for sheep skins, in which the 
U.S.A holds about a 20 percent share. This market accounts for half of all U.S. shipments 
of hides and skins other than cattle hides and fur skins to the PacRim. The U.S. supplies 
roughly 10 percent of the larger Taiwanese import market, which also appears to have 
expanded significantly over the long term. Japan imported approximately $65 million in 
wet-salted calf skins in 1987, comprising 51.4 percent of the region's imports in this 
category. But, this market shows no growth in the short run and a declining trend in the 
longer run. Further, the U.S. share is minuscule. Thus, the Japanese market may not offer 
as much future potential as those in Korea and Taiwan. 
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Table 42. Import Markets for Other Hides and Skins 
Significant Products: Total Imports ~ S. Korea Taiwan 
Calf Skins, Wet-Salted ($mil) 64.9 • • 
Sheep _Skins, Dry-Salted ($mil) • 16.5 • 
Other Hides (except Cattle) ($ mil) • • • 54 
Total Other Hides and Skins Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 51.4 18.2 22.8 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) 2.1 2.1 3.4 
U.S. Other Hides and Skins Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 1.8 19.3 9.3 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 2.1 8.1 4.9 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 13.4 51.2 31.2 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 -6 51 79 
1982-1987 0 b 5 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
b No volume data for 1982 
Pacific Rim imports of wool and mohair in 1987 were valued at $2.2 billion, making 
up a very significant 8 percent of all HVP in-bound shipments to the region. Seven 
different countries were identified as high potential import markets for a variety of wool 
and mohair products. Details on these markets, along with information about U.S. 
performance therein, are presented in Table 43. 
Wool and mohair imports into the Pacific Rim region increased at an annual average 
rate of 8 percent on a volume basis during the 1962-1987 period. However, in the latter 
5 years of this period, the growth rate fell to just 3 percent. Japan is the largest import 
market for these products, but one that appears to have stagnated in recent years. More 
rapid growth is exhibited in the other identified high potential markets with China, Korea, 
and Taiwan particularly notable for both their size and growth rates. Wool, both greasy 
and scoured, are the major products traded in this group. However, the U.S. is virtually a 
non-factor in most of these markets and, where it does some exporting, it is on a very small 
scale. The sheer size of the imported wool markets in these countries, combined with the 
practically non-existence of the U.S. as a supplier, would seem to present a great challenge 
to the U.S. sheep industry and one that could result in substantial export gains if strategies 
for successful market penetration can be established. 
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Table 43. Import Markets for Wool and Mohair (Part 1) 
Significant Products: Total Imports China ~ S. Korea Hong Kong 
Fine Goat Hair ($mil) • 76.8 • 
Hair, Fine Animal ($mil) • 90.4 36.2 57.9 
Woo~ Greasy ($mil) 258.2 448.7 116.1 • 
Woo~ Scoured ($mil) 285.6 397 105.4 46.3 
Total Wool and Mohair Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports (%) 24.4 45.7 11.8 4.9 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 34.1 73 10.9 3.7 
U.S. Wool and Mohair Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) b <1 b b 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) b 10.3 b b 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) b 68.3 b b 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 12 3 9 21 
1982-1987 10 -<1 13 19 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
b No Exports were reported from the U.S. by FATUS 
Table 43. Import Markets for Wool and Mohair (Part 2) 
Significant Products: Total Imports Taiwan India Pakistan 
Woo~ Greasy ($mil) 125.6 30 • 
Woo~ Scoured ($mil) 28.4 8 13.9 
Total Wool and Mohair Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 7.4 4.6 <1 
sh·are of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 8.6 7.1 2.3 
U.S. Wool and Mohair Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports (%) <1 1.4 b 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 1.8 3 b 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 11.8 19.9 b 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol. (%) 
1962-1987 11 15 14 
1982-1987 13 4 14 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
b No Exports were reported from the U.S. by FATUS 
Imports of cotton linters into the PacRim in 1987 were valued at $2.6 billion, nearly 
10 percent of all HVP acquisitions from foreign suppliers. Details on the identified high 
potential import markets for this product are included in Table 44. 
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Table 44. Cotton Linter Import Markets 
Total 1m ports Japan S. Korea Hong Kong Taiwan Malaysia 
Cotton Linters ($mil) 1U4.6 514.3 332.1 528.4 41.6 
Total Cotton Linter Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 44.3 20 U.9 20.6 1.6 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 8 21 11 27.5 4.5 
U.S. Cotton Linter Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) <1 • • <1 • 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 32.1 • • 1.9 • 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 94.6 • • 5.4 • 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 1 5 17 13 3 
1982-1987 1 8 5 10 27 
• No Exports were reported from the U.S. by FATUS 
Annual growth in the volume of cotton linter imports in the region during the 1962-
1987 period averaged 4 percent and rose during the last five years of this period to 6 
percent. This is another very large market where the U.S. share is almost non-existent. 
Japan alone is more than a $1 billion market and accounts for nearly all U.S. shipments to 
the region. But, even so, the U.S. is not a supply factor. South Korea and Taiwan are both 
half billion dollar markets and growing at impressive rates, again with virtually no U.S. 
presence. Overall, it would appear that there are several viable markets for cotton lint 
exports in the Pacific Rim, but that the U.S. is essentially a non-player in these markets. 
Imports of cotton other than linters in the region in 1987 totaled $29 million. Only 
one country met the high potential import market test, Taiwan. Details on this market are 
shown in Table 45. 
The compound annual rate of growth in the volume of cotton waste imports into 
the PacRim was 3 percent between 1962 and 1987 but expanded sharply to 16 percent, on 
average, during the last five years of this period. Taiwan is the major iinport market, 
taking about half of all of the region's in-bound shipments and accounting for most of the 
region's growth. Available data do not allow calculation of the U.S. share of the Taiwanese 
market, but this market appears to draw a relatively small share of total U.S. exports 
compared to its share of total PacRim imports. 
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Table 45. Import Markets for Cotton other than Linters 
Total Imports 
Cotton Waste ($mil) 
Total Cotton excluding Linters Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports (%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Cotton excluding Linters Exports 
U~S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
• Cannot be. calculated due to inconsistencies in available data 
Taiwan 
12.7 
49.6 
<1 
• 
8.4 
15.4 
21 
17 
Imports of fibers other than cotton into Pacific Rim countries in 1987 totaled $609 
million, nearly 8 percent of the hides, skins, and fiber category total. Several high potential 
import markets were identified. These are detailed in Table 46. 
Table 46. Import Markets for Natural Fibers other than Cotton 
Significant Products: Total Imports Japan S. Korea Hong Kong Taiwan India Pakistan 
Ramie ($mil) 115.9 • 22.3 14.1 • • 
Silk, raw and waste ($ mil) • 55.3 74.1 • 2.1 • 
Jute ($mil) • • • • • 28 
Total Fibers excluding Cotton Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 42.9 16.9 19.3 6 8.3 4.7 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 1.9 4.2 3.9 1.9 3.4 3.7 
U.S. Fibers excluding Cotton Exports 
b b b b U.S. Share of Imports(%) <1 <1 
Share of Total U.S. Exports (%) 2.6 b b <1 b b 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 92.3 b b 7.7 b b 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 2 27 41 38 -2 18 
1982-1987 -2 4 -<1 3 -1 27 
• Does not meet the high potential import' market tests 
b No Exports were reported from the U.S. by FATUS 
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PacRim imports of natural fibers other than cotton grew at an annual average pace 
of just 1 percent between 1962 and 1987 but the rate of growth accelerated markedly during 
the last 5 years, averaging 8 percent per year. Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea are the 
leading markets, together accounting for about 80 percent of the region's purchases. Ramie 
and silk are the most important import products in these markets, products for which the 
U.S. is not a supplier. The import market for jute in Pakistan has grown dramatically in 
recent years, but again this is a prqduct for which the U.S. is an unlikely supplier to world 
markets. 
Vegetables 
As a group, vegetable imports into the Pacific Rim countries were valued at $1,939 
million in 1987. This amounts to about 7.4 percent of all high-value product in-shipments 
to the region, ranking ahead of the eggs and dairy product grouping and behind the fruits, 
juices, and nuts classification. Fresh vegetables, canned vegetables, pulses, and frozen 
potatoes are the most significant products in this group. 
Imports of fresh vegetables totaled $328 million. Details on the identified high 
potential import markets, along with data on U.S. performance in those markets, are 
presented in Table 47. 
Table 47. Fresh Vegetable Import Markets 
Total Imports I.lmilll Hong Kong Brunei Malaysia Singapore 
Fresh Vegetables ($mil) 177.2 58.3 2.5 11.3 22.9 
Total Fresh Vegetable Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports (%) 54.3 29.5 <1 5.3 13.9 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 13 2.7 2.3 1.9 5.5 
U.S. Fresh Vegetable Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 8.8 13.9 • <1 1.7 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 5.8 4.2 • <1 2 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 40.8 29.5 • <1 13.9 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 31 -6 u 7 u 
1982-1987 12 3 26 2 4 
• No Exports were reported from the U.S. by FATUS 
The average annual rate of growth in import volume of fresh vegetables into the 
PacRim was 4 percent between 1962 and 1987. During the last five years of this period 
the growth rate declined to 2 percent. Japan and Hong Kong account for about 70 percent 
of the region's imports, and the U.S. bas achieved a modest market share in both countries. 
Japan is the largest importer, and has also registered an above-average rate of growth. 
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Brunei is a small. but rapidly expanding market in which the U.S. appears to have little or 
no presence. 
The total value of prepared or preserved vegetables (other than canned) imported to 
the Pacific Rim countries during 1987 was $1.1 billion, nearly 57 percent of all vegetable 
acquisitions on international markets. A wide variety of products could be identified in this 
product grouping, with 6 different countries meeting the criteria as high potential import 
markets for one or more of these products. Detailed information on these markets, along 
with data on U.S. performance, are shown in Table 48. 
The compound average annual rate of growth in PacRim import volume of prepared 
or preserved vegetables (other than canned) between 1962 and 1987 was 8 percent. During 
the last five years of this period the growth rate slowed somewhat to a 6 percent annual 
average. Japan is both the largest single import market for these products in the region and 
the fastest growing, expanding at an average rate of 16 percent per year since the early 
1980's. Japan accounts for about two-thirds of all PacRim imports in this product category 
and more than three-fifths of U.S. exports to the region. 
Table 48. Import Markets for Prepared or Preserved Vegetables (other than Canned) 
Significant Products: Total Imports ~ Hong Kong Brunei Malaysia Singapore 
Vegetable Produce, fresh or dried($ mil) 106.7 • • • 
Onions, dry ($mil) • • • 28.2 17.5 
Vegetables, dehydrated ($mil) 103.4 37.4 a a 16 
Mus brooms, dried ($mil) • 72.8 • 7.9 21 
Vegetables in Temp. Preservative ($mil) 105.1 • • • • 
Other Prepared Vegetables ($mil) 130.4 • • 7.4 a 
Infant Food ($mil) • • 1.4 7.8 9.8 
Total Prepared or Preserved Vegetable Imports, Other than Canned 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 65.8 15.4 <1 5.2 7.5 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 4.9 5.5 3 6 9.6 
U.S. Prepared or Preserved Vegetable Exports, Other than Canned 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 5.7 6 <1 2.3 7 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 11.1 2.8 <1 <1 1.6 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 61.9 15.4 <1 1.9 8.7 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 8 4 3 5 2 
1982-1987 16 5 10 5 3 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
Other sizable markets are Hong Kong and Singapore, but these are growing at a 
relatively slow pace while the small Brunei market is second only to Japan in rate of 
expansion. Overall, the U.S. has a relatively small presence in these markets and they 
53 
account for a minor share of U.S. vegetable exports. Thus, it would appear that the 
potential exists for significant increase in U.S. sales into these markets if the U.S. could 
increase its share of prepared or preserved vegetable shipments to the PacRim closer to 
that achieved for high-value products in total. 
Imports of canned vegetables into Pacific Rim countries during 1987 were valued at 
$122 million, or about 6 percent of all vegetable purchases. Hong Kong is the only high 
potential import market that could be identified in the region on the basis of the "above 
average" tests. This market is detailed in Table 49. 
Imports of canned vegetables in the region increased at an 11 percent compound 
average annual rate during the period 1962 to 1987. But, the growth rate declined to 4 
percent during the last five years of this period. Hong Kong accounts for more than half 
of the region's total imports, with canned mushrooms as the major identifiable product. 
This is a rapidly expanding product market in which the U.S. is a minor supplier. 
Table 49. Canned Vegetable Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports 
Canned Mushrooms ($mil) 
Other Canned Vegetables ($mil) 
Total Canned Vegetable Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Canned Vegetable Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
Hong Kong 
20.9 
47.2 
55.8 
2.3 
8.9 
5.4 
12.1 
6 
14 
Total imports of frozen potatoes in the region during 1987 were valued at $85 million. 
Only one high potential import market was identified, Japan. This is detailed in Table 50. 
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Table 50. Frozen Potato Import Markets 
Total Imports 
Frozen Potatoes ($mil) 
Total Frozen Potato Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Frozen Potato Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports (%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
• No 1982 data were available 
85.2 
99.3 
<1 
73.4 
75.7 
87.3 
• 
21 
Frozen potatoes imports in the PacRim increased at a compound annual rate 
averaging 21 percent during the 1982 to 1987 period. Nearly all imports go to Japan, 
where the U.S. supplies nearly three-fourths of the import market. This country accounts 
for most of the PacRim market and nearly all U.S. exports to the region. 
The region's imports of pulses in 1987 were valued as $339 million, about 17.5 
percent of all vegetable import purchases. Five high potential import markets for one or 
more products in this class were identified. These are detailed in Table 51. 
The compound annual rate of growth in the volume of pulse imports into the Pacific 
Rim countries during the period 1962-1987 averaged 5 percent. In the most recent five year 
period, the market has expanded at a somewhat faster, 7 percent average annual pace. 
India is the largest importer in the region, at $122 million taking nearly 40 percent of the 
PacRim total. India is also the most rapidly expanding import buyer. The U.S. bas about 
6 percent of this market, its largest share of any market in the region. The only other 
rapidly growing importer is Pakistan. However, the U.S. bas not taken advantage of the 
growth in that market. 
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Table 51. Import Markets for Pulses 
Significant Products: Total Imports Hon~ Kong India Pakistan Malaysia Singapore 
Peas, dry ($mil) • • 13.3 • • 
Lentils ($mil) • 24 • • • 
Beans, dry ($mil) 20.9 22 9.6 15.5 10.7 
Other Pulses ($mil) • 71 7.6 • • 
Total Pulses Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) U.4 37.5 9.8 6.9 3.9 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports{%) 1.4 8.7 4.2 2.5 1.6 
U.S. Pulses Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 1.5 5.7 <1 1.9 2.5 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) <1 3.4 <1 <1 <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 2.8 31.6 <1 1.9 1.5 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol. (%) 
1962-1987 5 39 -2 6 2 
1982-1987 1 26 22 2 4 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
Processed Grain Products 
Imports of processed grain products by Pacific Rim countries in 1987 totaled to $237 
million. This is the smallest of the high-value product categories, accounting for less than 
1 percent of all HVP imports in the region. Only three specific products could be 
identified in this category: pastry, macaroni, and breakfast cereals. Four countries met the 
high potential import market tests. These are detailed in Table 52. 
The compound annual rate of growth in the volume of processed grain products 
imported by Pacific Rim countries during the period 1962-1987 was 5 percent, but the 
growth rate declined to just 2 percent per year, on average, during the last 5 years of this 
period. Hong Kong and Singapore are the largest importers of products in this category, 
primarily importing pastry and macaroni. The U.S. has rather small shares of these 
markets. However, the FATUS categorization of data in the product class is rather 
nebulous, therefore the U.S. market share data may not be accurate. Brunei is a 
surprisingly significant importer, given its relatively small size, and has been expanding at 
a very rapid pace in recent years. Given the unimpressive U.S. presence here, this may 
represent a market opportunity that has been largely overlooked to date. 
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Table 52. Import Markets for Processed Grain Products 
Significant Products: Total Imports Hong Kong Brunei Malaysia Singapore 
Pastry ($mil) 29 4.1 a 2IJ.7 
Macaroni ($mil) 30.7 1.5 7.7 a 
Breakfast Cereals ($mil) a 1.2 a a 
Total Processed Grain Product Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 26.6 3.1 7.2 14.3 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 2.1 6.4 1.9 4 
U.S. Processed Grain Product Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 2.4 <1 1.6 5.6 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 1.2 <1 <1 1.5 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 6.7 <1 1.2 8.6 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 3 7 -12 -6 
1982-1987 9 18 1 1 
a Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
Sweeteners, Confectionery, Spices, and Beverages 
This category includes a wide variety of high-value products that are classified 
together primarily for ease of presentation. As a group, total imports into Pacific Rim 
countries in 1987 were valued at $4.6 billion, or roughly 18 percent of all HVP in-
shipments. This trails only the hides, skins, and fiber products category in terms of total 
import value. 
Total imports of sugar and related products by countries in the region during 1987 
were valued at $1.6 billion. Nine countries were identified as high potential import markets 
for one or more sugar-related product. Details on these markets are presented in Table 
53. 
The region's compound average annual rate of growth in sugar and related product 
imports between 1962 and 1987 was 4 percent. During the last 5 years of this period the 
rate of growth increased to 6 percent. This category contains sugar confectionery, refined 
sugar, and raw centrifugal sugar. There are several sizable markets for these imported 
products, led by Japan, China, and India. However, the U.S. has a very low presence in all 
of these markets except Japan, which accounts for nearly 80 percent of all U.S. shipments 
of sugar and related products into the PacRim. India is an exceptionally fast-growing 
market for refined sugar, a product that the U.S. apparently does not export to these 
international markets. Korea and Pakistan are also relatively fast-growth markets, the 
former for raw sugar and the latter for refined sugar. Given that the U.S. has achieved a 
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detectable market presence in the raw sugar markets in Japan and China, this suggests that 
Korea may be an untapped export opportunity for the U.S. raw sugar industry. 
Table 53. Import Markets for Sugar and Related Products (Part 1) 
Significant Products: Total Imports China lmrul S. Korea Hong KQng India 
Sugar Confectionery ($mil) • • • 37.2 • 
Refined Sugar ($mil) • • • 42.9 227 
Sugar (centrifugal, raw) ($mil) 285.1 288.2 186.4 • • 
Total Sugar and Related Product Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 17.9 25.9 11.9 5.9 14.3 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) 17.8 2.9 7.8 3.1 15.6 
U.S. Sugar and Related Product Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 5.5 18.4 <1 2.3 b 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 2.3 10.9 <1 <1 b 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim (%) 16.4 79 <1 2.3 b 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1%2-1987 -3 -4 10 10 114 
1982-1987 2 1 13 0 59 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
b No exports were reported from the U.S. by FATUS 
Table 53. Import Markets for Sugar and Related Products (Part 2) 
Significant Products: Total Imports Pakistan Brunei Malaysia Singapore 
Sugar Confectionery ($mil) a 1.2 a 14.5 
Refmed Sugar ($mil) 160.2 2.8 a 14.2 
Sugar (centrifugal, raw) ($mil) a • 132.5 29.2 
Total Sugar and Related Product Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 10.4 <1 8.7 3.9 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 21 3.7 15 7.5 
U.S. Sugar and Related Product Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) <1 <1 <1 <1 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) <1 <1 <1 <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) <1 <1 <1 <1 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1%2-1987 186 -2 9 8 
1982-1987 10 4 5 2 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
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Coffee imports into the Pacific Rim countries during 1987 were valued at $988 
million, second only to sugar and related products. Three markets met the high potential 
import market tests. Relevant information is presented in Table 54. 
Table 54. Coffee Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports 
Coffee Extracts 
Coffee, green 
Total Coffee Imports 
($mil) 
($mil) 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Coffee Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports (%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
• Does not meet the high potential import m<:·):et tests 
b No volume data were available for 1982 
Japan 
115.3 
723.8 
85.8 
6 
2 
19.6 
57.3 
8 
12 
S. Korea Malaysia 
• 20.9 
62.9 10 
6.4 3.1 
2.6 3.4 
<1 1.2 
<1 <1 
<1 1.3 
20 -3 
b 
-1 
The compound average annual rate r growth in the volume of coffee imports into 
the Pacific Rim between 1962 and 1987 was 10 percent. During the latter 5 years of this 
period the growth rate fell to 7 percent. Japan is the principal importer, with over 85 
percent of the region's total, and has been expanding at a well-above average rate. 
Surprisingly, the U.S. supplies about 2 percent of that market, which accounts for about 
one-fifth of all U.S. coffee exports worldwide. South Korea appears to be a rapidly-
growing coffee market and may present some expansion opportunities for U.S. exporters. 
Cocoa imports in the Pacific Rim were valued at $224 million in 1987. Two 
countries, China and Japan, were identified as high potential import markets. These are 
detailed in Table 55. 
Pacific Rim cocoa imports on a volume basis grew at an average annual rate of 4 
percent between 1962 and 1987 but were essentially unchanged during the final 5 years of 
that period. Japan is the major importer, followed by China. Together, they account for 
more than 90 percent of the region's total cocoa in-shipments. Not surprisingly, the U.S. 
is only a small supplier of cocoa, with Japan as the principal buyer. 
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Table 55. Cocoa Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports 
Cocoa Beans ($mil) 
Total Cocoa Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports (%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Cocoa Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
China Japan 
39.1 90.2 
18.6 71.8 
2.6 1.1 
<1 <1 
<1 10.4 
<1 74.4 
-6 0 
7 3 
Total PacRim chocolate imports in 1987 were valued at $209 million. Table 56 
contains details on the high potential import markets for chocolate products as well as 
data on U.S. performance in those markets. 
Table 56. Chocolate Import Markets 
Total Imports 
Chocolate Products ($ mil) 
Total Chocolate Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) 
U.S. Chocolate Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
a No 1982 data volume data were available 
Japan 
152.9 
73.1 
1 
19.2 
34.9 
68.9 
11 
19 
Hon~ Kon~ Brunei 
40.9 1.8 
19.5 <1 
1.4 1.5 
16.6 <1 
8 <1 
15.9 <1 
7 22 
8 a 
The compound average annual rate of growth in volume of chocolate imports in the 
region was 15 percent during the period from 1962 to 1987. This declined to 11 percent 
during the last five years of the period. Japan and Hong Kong make up approximately 93 
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percent of the PacRim chocolate import market; Japan is the largest and most rapidly 
expanding market. The U.S. supplies about 19 percent of Japan's imports and 17 percent 
in Hong Kong, and these two countries account for more than 
40 percent of all U.S. chocolate product exports. 
Imports of tea and mate in the Pacific Rim during 1987 were valued at $334 million. 
Details on the identified high potential import markets for tea are shown in Table 57. 
Table 57. Import Markets for Tea 
Total Imports China Japan Hong Kong Pakistan Malaysia 
Tea ($mil) 16 105.8 47.7 153.6 8.2 
Total Tea Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 4.8 31.7 14.3 46 2.5 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) <1 <1 1.6 19.5 <1 
U.S. Tea Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) • 3.6 1.3 • 4.1 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) • 25.2 4.2 • 2.2 
Share (If U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) • 77.8 13 • 6.9 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 19 5 -2 6 1 
1982-1987 13 13 7 8 2 
• FA TUS reported no exports in this category 
The compound annual rate of growth in the volume of tea and mate imports to the 
region was 8 percent between 1962 and 1987. During the latter five years this increased 
to 10 percent. Pakistan and Japan are the largest importers; China and Japan the most 
rapidly expanding. The U.S. has minor market shares in both Japan and Malaysia, with 
Japan accounting for most of the U.S. shipments to the region. 
Spice imports in the Pacific Rim during 1987 were valued at $298 million. Malaysia 
was the only country that met the high potential import market tests. Details are shown 
in Table 58. 
The average annual rate of growth in the volume of spice imports in the region 
between 1962 and 1987 was 5 percent. During the 1982-1987 period the growth rate 
dropped to 2 percent. Malaysia takes just 16 percent of the region's total, and the U.S. is 
essentially not a supplier to this market. This seems an unlikely product for much 
additional U.S. export activity. 
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Table 58. Spice Import Markets 
Significant Products: Total Imports 
Garlic 
Pimento, Allspice 
Total Tea Imports 
($mil) 
($mil) 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 
U.S. Tea Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 
Share of Total U.S. Exports (%) 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 
1982-1987 
Malaysia 
15.8 
14 
15.9 
5.2 
<1 
<1 
<1 
8 
2 
Total Pacific Rim imports of beverages excluding juices and wines were valued at 
$793 million in 1987, amounting to 3 percent of all HVP imports into the region. A 
number of high potential import markets were identified within the region, mostly for 
distilled alcoholic beverages. These are detailed in Table 59. 
Table 59. Import Markets for Beverages (excluding Juices and Wines) 
Significant Products: Total Imports Japan Hong Kong Taiwan Brunei Malaysia 
Distilled Alcoholic Beverages($ mil) 396.2 162.3 47.8 • 45.6 
Non-alcoholic Beverages ($mil) 71 • • 11.4 • 
Total Beverage Imports, excluding juices and wines 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 60.6 22.4 6.3 1.5 5.9 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports(%) 3.9 5.9 2.6 10.4 5 
U.S. Beverage Exports, excluding juices and wines 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 3 7.4 11.8 " <1 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 20.4 18.8 8.4 " <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 42.2 38.9 17.5 c <1 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 18 17 6 22 77 
1982-1987 22 10 b 35 17 
• Does not meet the high potential import market tests 
b No 1982 volume data 
"No Exports were reported from the U.S. by FATUS 
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The import volume of beverages (excluding juices and wines) by PacRim countries 
between 1962 and 1987 grew at an average annual rate of 17 percent, accelerating to a 33 
percent annual growth rate during the latter 5 years. Japan and Hong Kong are the two 
leading importers, mostly of distilled alcoholic beverages, together accounting for more than 
80 percent of the region's total in-shipments. Brunei is a relatively small but fast-growing 
market, mainly for non-alcoholic beverages. U.S. shipments in this region go primarily to 
Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. 
Total imports of wine into the Pacific Rim countries in 1987 were valued at $185 
million. Details on identified high potential import markets in the region are presented 
in Table 60. 
Annual growth in the volume of wine imports in the Pacific Rim during the 1962-
1987 period averaged 16 percent. By the last 5 years of this period the growth rate had 
declined by half, to 8 percent. Japan is the largest and most rapidly-growing import market, 
drawing nearly three-fourths of all PacRim wine imports. It also accounts for more than 
70 percent of all U.S. wine shipments to the region, and the U.S. supplies about 9 percent 
of the Japanese imports. Brunei is a small but rapidly expanding market, where no U.S. 
presence is reported. 
Table 60. Wine Import Markets 
Total Imports Japan Hon~ Kon~ Brunei Sin~apore 
Wine ($mil) 135.8 23.5 1.2 10 
Total Wine Imports 
Share of Total Pacific Rim Imports(%) 73.6 12.7 <1 5.4 
Share of Total High Value Product Imports (%) <1 <1 <1 1.2 
U.S. Wine Exports 
U.S. Share of Imports(%) 9.1 4.4 • 2.7 
Share of Total U.S. Exports(%) 21.6 1.8 • <1 
Share of U.S. Exports to Pacific Rim(%) 70.5 5.9 • 1.6 
Compound Avg. Ann. Rates of Growth in Import Vol.(%) 
1962-1987 7 9 6 1 
1982-1987 24 4 17 8 
• No Exports were reported from the U.S. by FATUS 
Manufactured Tobacco Products 
Manufactured tobacco products imported into the Pacific Rim countries in 1987 
were valued at $1.1 billion. This equals 4 percent of all high value product imports in the 
region, ranking ahead of the processed grain products, live animals, and eggs and dairy 
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products categories. These imports have increased at an average annual rate equivalent to 
6 percent over the 25 year, 1962 to 1987 period but by a very significant 19 percent during 
the most recent 5 year period. Thus, this potentially represents an important region for 
U.S. export activities. However, limits on available data precluded application of the high 
potential import market tests, nor were U.S. market share data available on a country by 
country basis. 
Summary: 
High-Profile Pacific Rim Markets 
The preceding analysis resulted in 356 specific product/country combinations that 
met our tests as high potential import markets for high value agricultural products. While 
this represents a substantial reduction from the more than 1300 possible product and 
country combinations that exist among the Pacific Rim countries, it still leaves a nearly 
overwhelming number of alternatives to be considered for· further market development by 
U.S. exporters. 
In order to identify a small number of markets from this set of 356, two additional 
(arbitrary) selection rules were imposed: (1) product/country combinations where the total 
value of imports (1987 basis) exceeded $250 million, and (2) combinations where the U.S. 
share of total imports (1987 value basis) was at least 25 percent. The "high profile" markets 
that meet either or both of these selection rules are shown in Table 61. 
Table 61. High Profile Import Markets for High Value Products in PacRim Countries 
(Part 1) 
Product Class 
. Poultry Meat 
Cattle Hides 
Processed Fruits/Juices 
Country 
Japan 
Hong Kong 
South Korea 
Japan 
Taiwan 
Japan 
Taiw~ 
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Volume U.S. Market Share 
($mil.) (%) 
1987 1987 
324 26.6 
a 512 
764 75.5 
443 75.6 
291 60.1 
260 • 
a 363 
Table 61. High Profile Import Markets for High Value Products in PacRim Countries 
(Part 2) 
Product Class Country Volume U.S. Market Share 
($mil.) (%) 
1987 1987 
Soybean Oil India 463 • 
Pakistan • 88.0 
Cotton Linters Japan 1,125 • 
Taiwan 528 • 
South Korea 514 • 
Hong Kong 332 • 
Wool China 544 • 
Japan 449 
Sugar Japan 288 • 
China 285 • 
Tallow Pakistan • 64.0 
South Korea • 57.6 
Citrus Fruit Japan • 65.6 
Hong Kong 51.7 
Grapes Hong Kong • 50.4 
Singapore • 28.7 
Apples Taiwan • 42.8 
Hong Kong • 36.7 
Coffee Japan 724 • 
Cattle Offals (edible) Japan 404 • 
Distilled Beverages Japan 396 • 
Bananas Japan 371 • 
Fur Skins Hong Kong 260 • 
Rapeseed Oil India 250 • 
Almonds Japan • 78.6 
Frozen Potatoes Japan· • 73.4 
Variety Meats Japan • 31.9 
• Does not meet the dollar value or market share test 
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A total of eight countries and 20 product categories met the high profile market tests, 
creating a total of 34 combinations. Four product/country combinations (poultry meat in 
Japan, and cattle hides in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan), met both the dollar volume 
and U.S. market share tests. Products that met the dollar value test in at least one PacRim 
country, but not the U.S. market share test, include cotton linters, wool, sugar, coffee, 
cattle offals, distilled beverages, bananas, fur skins, and rapeseed oil. Products that met the 
U.S. market share test, but not the dollar volume criterion include tallow, citrus fruit, 
grapes, apples, almonds, frozen potatoes, and variety meats. Additionally two product 
groups, processed fruits and juices and soybean oil, met the dollar volume test in one 
country and the market share test in another. These markets would appear to be likely 
targets for export development efforts by U.S. firms. 
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Export Promotion Effectiveness 
for Agricultural Products 
John P. Nichols* 
Foreign market development programs have expanded greatly in recent years. 
Spurred on by growing export demand and U.S. production capacity in the 1970s, exports 
of agricultural commodities grew at an unprecedented rate. The growth in these markets 
was too great to be sustained under any reasonable economic circumstances. So the bubble 
burst in the 1980s and the reality of digging and scratching for markets set in. Figures 1 
and 2 illustrate the roller-coaster ride for agricultural exports in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Williams, 1989). 
Worldwide recession and major shifts in exchange rates caused a serious decline in 
both volume and dollar value of U.S. agricultural exports. Aggressive marketing efforts by 
competitors also contributed to this decline. Policy makers and industry organizations 
turned their attention to the fundamentals of our global agricultural trade position, price 
competitiveness, and a proactive market development effort. 
Marketing Fundamentals 
The fundamentals have been addressed in recent years. The 1985 Farm Bill created 
mechanisms to compete more effectively on a price basis in international markets. On-
going negotiations in the GATT and bi-lateral agreements such as the U.S.- Canada free 
trade agreement are addressing the reduction of trade barriers. Market development 
activities have received a substantial boost through the Targeted Export Assistance (TEA) 
program operated by the Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) of USDA under the 1985 Farm 
Bill. 
'Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University. 
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Figure 1. Volume of U.S. Agricultural Exports by Commodity, Fiscal Years 
1972-88. 
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Figure 2. Value of U.S. Agricultural Exports by Commodity, Fiscal Years 1972-88. 
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The effectiveness of non-price competitive aspects of market development are the 
focus of discussion in this paper. Through the TEA program and other generic export 
promotion efforts of commodity interest groups, greater attention must be given to key 
marketing management concepts. Reducing prices and eliminating trade barriers can help 
sell product, but long-run success still depends on knowledge of markets, understanding 
competitors, and effective market organization. This knowledge of markets includes an 
understanding of product characteristics and how these products are used, distribution 
channels, and pricing arrangements. Promotion efforts will achieve maximum effectiveness 
as part of the marketing mix only if these other components are effectively understood and 
managed. 
Effectiveness: What is it? 
With the advent of increased export promotion activities for agricultural commodities 
and high-value products, questions are being raised more frequently concerning 
effectiveness. These questions are raised by program managers and those charged with 
oversight and administration of public programs supporting generic and targeted export 
development efforts. Commodity organizations and F AS are important participants in 
management and program execution. Issues of evaluation and effectiveness are receiving 
greater attention. 
While the need for, and interest in, studies of effectiveness is evident, there are 
relatively few examples of controlled studies of export promotion effectiveness. It's not 
hard to find reasons for this. Advertising and market promotion activities appeal to a 
complex set of human emotions and decisions. Sorting out and isolating the effects of a 
specific activity is a difficult process. Promotion efforts are believed to provide returns over 
an often indefinite period of time, thus introducing the complexity of measuring response 
well after the application promotion inputs. These problems are well known limitations to 
the study of promotion effectiveness in domestic marketing circumstances. When one 
attempts to make similar assessments in foreign markets, these complexities are magnified 
and new problems arise. Data availability, effects of changing exchange rates, and the 
effects of export and import regulations and policies are examples. 
Effectiveness measurement is simply one part of the marketing management process. 
Any managerial undertaking should include an evaluation and control phase. Effectiveness 
of export promotion programs can be assessed on two levels. First, some measure of gross 
response may be of interest. What return has been achieved per dollar invested? What 
is the aggregate change in sales (exports) as a result of the promotion activity? These are 
examples of indicators used to gain some general knowledge of program or activity 
effectiveness. 
Most managerial assessments, however, need to go beyond this level to a question 
of relative effectiveness. Managers need to know which alternative promotion activity is 
"best" or achieves the greatest response. Allocation of fixed promotion resources are 
typically made among markets, among types of activities, and over time. An understanding 
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of relative effectiveness and some sense of effectiveness at the margin is needed to guide 
management decisions. It is sometimes argued that this is more an art than a science, but 
there is no question that decision-making could be improved if better information were 
available regarding effectiveness of key export promotion strategies. 
Studies of Effectiveness in Domestic Markets 
Generic advertising and promotion effectiveness have been the focus of studies in 
U.S. markets for nearly fifty years. Generic commodity promotion expenditures are 
approaching $500 million annually. Many empirical studies have focused on the advertising 
component of the marketing mix. Theoretical constructs and data availability have 
encouraged this focus because better empirical tests could be derived. Other dimensions 
of market development strategies are more qualitative in concept and are less conducive 
to traditional market experimentation or econometric techniques, although some studies of 
merchandising, in-store promotions, and couponing have qeen done. 
The dairy industry is one example where extensive evaluation has been undertaken. 
A study completed at Cornell in 1975 estimated a 2 to 1 ratio of net returns to advertising 
costs for milk in New York City (Thompson and Eiler, 1975). A recent study of U.S. 
cheese promotion and markets estimated an increase in sales of 114 billion lbs. from 1984 
through 1987 resulting from generic promotion efforts (Blaylock and Blisard, 1988). 
Citrus is another industry where generic promotion efforts have been the subject of 
many evaluation studies. In an overview of this work, several general observations were 
made (Lee, 1983). Positive influences on sales from both generic and branded advertising 
were documented. Carryover effects of up to 15 months were found. In another interesting 
point it was concluded that there should be an even distribution of advertising over quarters 
of the year. 
These results are presented here simply to indicate that research has been successful 
in documenting the response to generic promotion programs in some domestic markets. 
Next we will look at what studies have found for similar programs focusing on export 
market development efforts. 
Export Promotion Effectiveness 
The need for evaluation of export promotion activities is the same as in domestic 
markets, but the problems, as indicated previously, are many. Typical export market 
development efforts by commodity groups include activities of three types: (1) trade 
servicing, (2) technical assistance, and (3) consumer promotion. 
Trade servicing refers to a multitude of activities targeted at the trade and designed 
to achieve awareness and adoption of the product by importers, wholesalers, dealers, or 
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industrial users. Examples include trade show participation, special meetings and 
conferences, public relations, trade incentives, food service promotion, and other 
merchandising activities aimed at market channel participants. 
Technical assistance refers to an array of activities, also aimed at the trade, but 
which provide more specific technical help. Activities in this group include assistance on 
product formulation and use, processing guidelines, facilities development, providing 
consultants, or doing technical research. 
Consumer promotion includes all those activities designed to directly influence 
consumer decision-making regarding purchase and use. Activities of this type include paid 
media advertising, point-of-purchase advertising, development and distribution of recipes, 
and the demonstration of products in retail stores. 
Analysis of effectiveness is complicated by the qualitative nature of many of these 
export promotion activities. Quantifying the level of expenditures for specific activity, the 
duration of the activity, and correlating each with measurable results is a difficult task. 
Many of the published studies measured effects associated with an aggregate set of activities 
so that broad conclusions can be drawn. While this may help in explaining programs to 
producer groups and others, these types of studies may only give limited insight into specific 
allocation problems facing export promotion program managers. Results from several 
published studies are presented as examples of what has been done. 
Citrus Cooperator Programs in Europe 
As with domestic markets, the Florida citrus industry has lead the way in economic 
assessment of generic promotion efforts in export markets as well. A series of studies 
conducted over the period from 1969 through 1983 examined the returns from programs 
conducted under the FAS cooperator program in Europe (Lee, 1985). The 1977 study 
estimated that frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) additional export revenue averaged 
about $1.33 per dollar invested for all partners in the cooperator program. Returns to 
Florida processors alone amounted to $4.29 per dollar invested. 
In 1979 this analysis was updated. Returns per dollar invested over the 1972 to 1977 
period were estimated to be $4.85 and $14.97 for all contributors and Florida citrus 
processors, respectively. Further analyses indicated that, in terms of marketing a given 
amount of FCOJ, export promotion was 2 to 4 times less expensive than price discounting 
(Lee, Myers, and Forsee, 1979). 
Updated again in 1983, returns over the period 1972 to 1982 were estimated for all 
program contributors to average $5.51 per dollar invested. Disaggregated to a country level, 
returns were found to vary from $2.30 to $6.80 per dollar invested. 
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Soybean Cooperator Program 
Another well-documented study of export promotion effectiveness examined the 
soybean cooperator program over the 1970 to 1980 period (Williams, 1985). This 
econometric study attempted to identify and isolate the effects of expenditures made to 
develop export markets during this period. While the results are sensitive to model 
formulation and several key assumptions, the study incorporates the supply response linkage 
which is often not included in assessments of effectiveness of demand shifting strategies. 
Several results are important. Over the study period returns to all contributors were 
estimated to be $62 of increased gross receipts per dollar invested. Gross returns at the 
producer level increased $58 per dollar invested, while net returns at the producer level 
were estimated to be $14. 
From an allocation point-of-view it was found that returns per dollar were higher in 
European markets when compared with other regions. Another important observation was 
that the U.S. program had a positive, though much smaller, impact on exports of soybeans 
from Brazil. Generic promotion programs can have an unintended benefit for other 
producing regions. 
Other Commodity Studies 
Similar estimates of response to export promotion have been obtained for other 
commodities. A study of Cotton Council International's promotion for cotton in Japan from 
1979 through 1983 examined response to consumer advertising for cotton products (Beach 
and Deariso). They estimated that the sale of U.S. cotton increased approximately $17 per 
dollar spent by FAS. 
A 1986 study by Rosson, Hammig, and Jones estimated response to export promotion 
for several commodities. They estimated a response of $60 increase in export sales of 
apples associated with one dollar increase in promotion over the period from 1974 through 
1981. Tobacco exports were estimated to increase $31 per dollar of export promotion. 
The estimates of impact discussed above are examples of the level of response which 
might be expected. It is certainly useful to know that substantial increases in export sales 
can be obtained through promotion and market development efforts. However, it is also 
important to recognize that most of these estimates are gross averages which mask a great 
deal of variation related to time, country or region, and level of expenditures. Average 
responses at low levels cannot automatically be projected to apply at higher levels of 
expenditure. Nonetheless, there is evidence from many commodities, under a variety of 
circumstances, that export promotion efforts will achieve important positive responses for 
commodity and producer groups. 
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Managerial Needs 
Only a few of the studies cited above contribute to the issue of improving export 
promotion programs. Comparison of alternatives is the key to improved program 
management. Simple averages don't tell the story in sufficient detail. Response rates at 
different levels of expenditure, for different types of promotion activity, or in different 
markets are provided in only a few published studies. 
For intensive managerial needs, more refined tests are required. Some effort must 
be expended in designing simple experiments, controlling other important factors, and 
collecting data on all important variables. This is neither easy nor inexpensive, but if 
program managers are to learn from their experience (and the experiences of others), then 
planning for data collection and market analysis is crucial at the early stages of program 
development. There is a certain "art" to the market development process but that can be 
aided by improved information gained through market research. 
Influences on Market Development Strategies 
Selecting among competing strategies in export market development is a major 
management task. How can these decisions be improved? In addition to greater emphasis 
on specifically designed market tests as discussed above, it is important to have a conceptual 
understanding of primary influencing factors. These may be viewed in three different 
dimensions: (1) product or commodity type, (2) level of economic development of target 
market, and (3) degree of market penetration. 
Product/Commodity Type 
Agricultural exports may be classified into three groups, somewhat related to value 
per unit and degree of processing. Bulk commodities such as grains and oilseeds represent 
by far the largest tonnage of U.S. exports. High value commodities may be thought of as 
including meat, grain, and oilseed products and other types of intermediate bulk products 
derived from raw agricultural commodities. Specialty crops and finished products form the 
third group. These include consumer packaged foods and such items as horticultural crops. 
In some ways these can be viewed as a continuum from low value, unprocessed bulk 
commodities on the one end, to the most highly processed, high value consumer products 
on the other end. One would expect the effectiveness of different promotion strategies to 
vary widely across this continuum. -
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Level of Economic Development 
The amount of consumer discretionary income in the market is certainly another 
important factor. The "sophistication" of the market, its channels of distribution, and 
consumer preferences is correlated with level of economic development. Effectiveness of 
market development and promotion activities will vary greatly across economic development 
levels. More emphasis on consumer advertising would be expected in markets with 
substantial discretionary consumer income while technical assistance for bulk commodities 
might be more widely used in markets at an earlier stage of economic development. 
Degree of Market Penetration 
This is a measure of the relationship to competitors in the market (Williams, 1988). 
If there are few effective competitors, then market development activities would be 
designed to shift demand for the basic commodity or category of products such as feed 
grains or all meat. If, however, there are strong potential suppliers of competing 
commodities, then emphasis would be given to those activities which differentiate and shift 
demand for commodities by specific type (rice as distinct from food grains). At a higher 
level of competition, activities must be designed to distinguish specific sources or brands 
and shift demand at that level (U.S. long-grain rice, Washington apples, etc.). 
Interactions 
lllustration of these influences can be described by contrasting the types of export 
market development activities against the continuum of commodity /product types (Figure 
3). As noted above, one would expect the mix of activities to favor consumer promotion 
more for those markets when incomes are high and the emphasis is on high-value consumer 
packaged goods. Technical assistance support would be emphasized to a much greater 
degree for bulk commodities. Trade servicing types of activities would fall somewhere in 
between but probably increase in importance where more complex market channels existed 
and for more specialized high value products. 
Improvements and Conclusions 
Several broad observations can be drawn from existing studies and this basic 
framework. First, there is evidence that well designed and executed export promotion 
efforts can yield significant results. It will be difficult for most U.S. commodity groups to 
avoid addressing export markets so- careful attention to export market development is 
warranted. 
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Figure 3. Conceptual Relationship between Commodity /Product Type and Mix of Export 
Promotion Activities. 
The level of expenditure and type of activities utilized must be continuously 
reevaluated in relation to the market addressed. Size, competition, and degree of 
development all are key factors. Don't extrapolate too far from general studies done by 
others. 
More and better designed market tests are needed. Good management in export 
promotion is no different than any other business activity. It is possible to design and 
implement very useful market tests in most export markets. 
It has also been observed that a different mix of generic promotion efforts are 
required in more developed markets. Recognition of this is important in developing a well 
targeted strategic marketing plan. · 
There is a need for better integration of export promotion strategies with product 
management. One of the key limitations to generic promotion sponsored by commodity 
groups is the discontinuity between the promotion efforts and the product management and 
other marketing decisions made by individual firms exporting products within that 
commodity group. More emphasis on planning and coordination will benefit both the 
individual exporters and the industry. 
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Institutional Changes Ahead: 
Perceptions, Attitudes, and Reality 
Maury E. Bredaht 
Introduction 
A host of well-known international factors will continue to affect agriculture: the 
debt burden of developing nations that limits their ability to import agricultural products; 
the weak dollar, needed to control the large trade deficit of the United States, which favors 
agricultural exports; and the high interest rates, relative to historical levels, needed to 
ensure an inflow of foreign funds to finance the U.S. budget deficit. Although each of these 
factors directly affects U.S. agriculture, all of them contribute also to the environment of 
international trade relations and the on-going negotiations in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
In this paper I review that environment, the perceptions and attitudes of trading 
nations, the state of international trade relations, and the forces that have contributed to 
the current animosity between the United States and its trading partners. Perceptions and 
attitudes bear on legislation and on various actions that may be taken against the trading 
practices of other nations. Agricultural trade is conducted within the reality of international 
trade relations. But included in that reality are the several perceptions held about 
agricultural trade and the attitudes derived from them. 
The starting point is to define each of these words and relate that definition to the 
atmosphere of international trade relations: 
perception: an understanding, mental image; international agreement on the 
problem. 
attitude: a mental position concerning a perception; solution to the problem. 
reality: something that is not dependent, but exists necessarily. 
·Professor of International Trade and Marketing in the Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Missouri-
Columbia and Director of the Center for International Trade Expansion. 
77 
International Trade Relations 
Perceptions 
An important perception held by the U.S. Congress, and by the public for that 
matter, is that other nations are "unfair traders." Japan is most often singled out for special 
attention. Members of Congress "perceive" that the unfair trading practices of other nations 
contribute to our stubbornly large trade deficit. An associated perception is that 
international trading rules have been ineffective in our dealing with the unfair trading 
actions of other nations. 
Other nations allege that the large and stubborn U.S. budget deficit causes the 
equally large trade deficit. They reason that the United States is consuming too much, and 
that the demand for goods, fueled by the budget deficit, can be met only by imports. They 
perceive that the United States is withdrawing from its international commitments as it 
addresses its stubborn budget and trade deficits. Our trading partners point to the attitudes 
of Congress, and the recently enacted Trade Act, as proof of their perception. 
In addition to the provisions of the Trade Act, they point to the oil-tax funding of 
the "Superfund," a fund that is to be used to restore environmental quality in especially 
polluted areas. They regard the tax as discriminatory, because when Congress levied a tax 
on oil to provide the necessary funds it put a higher fee on imported oil than on domestic 
production. This provision denies ''national treatment" to oil imports. The national 
treatment rule requires that any imports into a country receive the same treatment as 
domestic production. It is a fundamental international obligation under the GATI. Not 
only is the superfund clearly discriminatory, it is said, but the United States has blocked 
consideration of the issue in the multilateral forum set up for addressing such issues. 
Canadians point to our action in putting countervailing duties on their hog and pork 
exports to the United States, action taken in spite of the recently signed U.S./Canadian 
Free Trade Agreement. They call it evidence of U.S. withdrawal from its international 
obligations. 
Attitudes 
The perceptions that other nations don't play fair and that international rules don't 
work bas fostered the attitude that legislation is required to allow the United States to take 
unilateral actions against alleged offenders. The "Super 301" provision of the Trade Act 
facilitates actions by U.S. producers against imports, and it forces the government to 
respond in a very short time. Other provisions of the law require the government to specify 
which nations, and which of their trading practices, are regarded as allowing them an unfair 
competitive position in U.S. markets. The countries on this "bit list" must respond to the 
allegations within a short period. H the dispute cannot be resolved in bilateral negotiations, 
the U.S. government must take punitive action. 
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Of considerable importance is the attitude that international trade sanctions can be 
used to counter what are essentially domestic policies in other nations. The United States 
has challenged the beef import restrictions of South Korea on the grounds that they are 
unfairly restrictive on importation of beef. The import restrictions are an integral part of 
the price stabilization and income support policies of South Korea. The two policy 
objectives are essentially domestic decisions. Many nations would argue that such internal 
matters should not be subject to international review and scrutiny. 
The United States has also adopted the attitude that if international rules don't work, 
the establishment of bilateral free-trade areas is the next best way to pursue free trade. 
This attitude led to the U.S./Canadian Free Trade Agreement and to negotiations with 
other nations for similar arrangements. 
Other nations interpret the situation differently. Each does so, of course, in its own 
self-interest. The attitude in each case is that the withdrawal of the United States from its 
international commitments justifies similar actions on that nation's part to remedy trade 
disputes. 
Reality 
Other nations will increasingly adopt the attitude that if it's okay for the United 
States (to ignore international rules and procedures), its okay for them too. This attitude 
could result in two policy initiatives in other nations: enactment of national laws that allow 
them to take similar actions in similar circumstances, and, eventually, international 
acceptance of their right to do so in the rules of international trade agreements. 
The reality coming into view is a tougher, meaner, and more uncertain trading 
environment. It is international acceptance of the right of other nations to question what 
are essentially domestic policy decisions. The negotiations on agricultural trade will be 
shaped by this reality. 
International Agricultural Trade Negotiations 
Perceptions 
Three perceptions held by the United States and its trading partners determine the 
attitudes that drive international agricultural trade relations and the agricultural trade 
negotiations. These are perceptions that --
• 
• 
• 
domestic farm programs distort trade; 
farm programs are too costly; 
GATT rules for agricultural trade are inadequate . 
79 
Farm Programs Distort Trade 
Nations concur in the belief that domestic agricultural policies distort trade. Many 
policies raise producer prices above border prices and so stimulate production. These 
policies often increase consumer prices as well and so dampen demand. Both effects tend 
to reduce trade. These are the theses. Concurring that domestic farm policies distort trade 
means that those policies must be subject to trade negotiations. 
The perception that farm policies distort trade grew out of a measurement of their 
impacts on producer revenues and consumer expenditures. Such a calculation was necessary 
to move the international debate from an emotional to an intellectual level, and to focus 
discussion on the policies themselves and not on their political justification. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated 
the subsidy that would be necessary to compensate farmers for the removal of all protective 
measures in their behalf. This statistic, termed the producer subsidy equivalent, is shown 
in Figure 1 for key products in the United States, the European Community (EC), and 
Japan. The figure relates the subsidy to farmer revenues by expressing it as a percent of 
those revenues. 
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Figure 1. The Subsidy, as a Percent of Total Revenues Needed to Compensate Producers 
for the Loss of Government Programs. 
The first panel illustrates the subsidy for red meats. Because the United States has 
few programs for these products, the subsidy equivalent is only about 10 percent. In the 
EC, about 40 percent of the revenues of livestock producers is attributed to policy actions. 
In Japan, the subsidy is even greater: about 70 percent of the revenue of livestock 
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producers is so attributed. For the EC and Japan, a significant part of the subsidy simply 
offsets the high prices for feedstuffs that arise from farm policies that protect their cereal 
producers. U.S., Australian, and other livestock exporters allege that these subsidies 
stimulate livestock production in the EC and Japan and hence reduce their (e.g. U.S.) 
exports. 
The subsidy that would be needed to compensate dairy farmers in the event of 
removal of dairy-producer protect~on is large everywhere. It ranges from about 60 percent 
of farmer revenues in the EC and the United States to almost 90 percent in Japan. 
Exporters of dairy products allege that the production arising from such large subsidies 
significantly reduces trade -- and their chance to export. 
The third panel illustrates the subsidy required to compensate wheat producers for 
the removal of government aids. Farmers in the United States and the EC receive about 
30 percent of their revenues from the effect of government policies. The subsidy to 
Japanese wheat producers is very large: almost all of their revenues can be attributed to 
government policies. To promote the switch from rice to wheat production, which is 
encouraged, the wheat subsidy must exceed that paid for rice production, which itself is very 
large. 
The subsidy equivalent for U.S. sugar producers (about 90 percent) is much greater 
than that paid producers of other crops in the United States, and exceeds that accruing to 
sugar producers in other nations. The United States relies on stringent import quotas to 
drive the domestic price of sugar -- typically to almost four times its border price. Removal 
of the import restrictions would cause the domestic price to plummet, and would require 
a modification in the domestic sugar program if producer incomes were to be sustained. 
This illustrates the basis for the perception that domestic farm programs distort trade, and 
must therefore be subject to international negotiation. 
Cost of Farm Programs 
The perception that farm policies distort trade does not greatly affect the attitudes 
of nations. After all, farm programs have changed little for many years and they have not 
been subject to international review. The perception that farm programs are too costly does 
affect the attitude of individual nations as their governments look to an international 
agreement to bolster their negotiating position with their own domestic farm groups. 
Two components of the cost of farm programs are direct government expenditures 
and the consumer cost of high food prices. These two costs amount to about $250 billion 
annually for all developed countries combined. Besides these costs to those countries, farm 
programs in developed nations that subsidize production and exports cost developing 
nations $10 billion annually as they lose markets, and transfer about the same amount to 
the Centrally Planned countries in reduced import costs to them. 
In the United States, the cost of farm programs is reckoned to be about $40 billion, 
and in the EC it is about $45 billion (see Figure 2). The cost in Japan is about half that 
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amount. A significant portion of the cost to the United States (about $15 billion) and to 
the EC (about $10 billion) serves to offset the impacts of policies in other countries. 
Subsidized production and exports drive down border prices, which drives up subsidy costs 
in other countries. The perception that a large portion of costs borne by an individual 
country simply offsets other countries' policies has bolstered the willingness to negotiate 
agricultural policies multilaterally. 
On the other hand very little of the internal costs of domestic farm policies to Japan 
can be traced to the policies of other countries. The relative isolation of Japan as a food 
importer helps explain her contention that problems in international agricultural trade are 
caused by production and export subsidies of other nations. The countries providing those 
subsidies should assume responsibility for remedying the situation, as it is not a Japanese 
problem: thus the Japanese declare. 
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Figure 2. The Cost of Agricultural Policies. 
The perception that developing nations suffer from the subsidized production and 
exports of developed nations contributes to the attitude that farm policies should be 
reviewed internationally. Importers among the developing nations gain from lower prices, 
but the loss to their own exporters more than offsets that gain. In total the cost to 
developing nations is about $10 billion annually. By coincidence, this happens to equal the 
benefit to centrally planned countries from importing commodities reduced in price by 
export subsidies of developed market economies (Figure 2) 
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GATT Rules are Inadequate 
Many nations have insisted that international trading rules for agricultural products 
must be different from those for industrial products. The United States has insisted that 
Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which allows import restrictions if production 
is likewise restricted, takes precedent over GATT obligations. The EC has long argued that 
its Common Agricultural Policy, which entails variable import tariffs and export subsidies, 
is a domestic program and not subject to international obligations. Canada, using the same 
logic as the United States, has felt free to put import restrictions on products that are 
subject to Canadian supply control. Because nations have not wanted international 
disciplines on agricultural programs, the GATT has not governed trade in agricultural 
products effectively. But as trade disputes have escalated in recent years and budget costs 
have risen, there has been a growing recognition and acceptance of a need to recast the 
GATT rules for agricultural trade. 
The conceptual framework underlying GATT is based on: 
consensus rules: 
enforcement by 
agreement: 
reciprocity: 
national treatment: 
unanimous agreement is required for the adoption of rules and 
disciplines. 
a nation must agree that its policies and trade actions can be 
challenged by other nations, and, moreover, must agree to 
accept a penalty for offenses. 
any concession offered to a nation must be extended equally to 
all other nations. 
imports must receive the same treatment as domestic 
production. 
Clearly, a great many agricultural policies of developed nations violate these basic GATT 
principles. 
The GATT is to international trade what the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) is to college athletics. But the job of the NCAA is easier. Hit were 
to operate with the same framework as the GATT: 
• 
• 
rule changes would require unanimous approval of all universities, rather than 
a simple majority; 
a university could refuse to allow investigation of its recruiting program, and 
if it did allow an investigation, it could elect not to accept the prescribed 
penalty. 
The NCAA would be an impotent force in college athletics if it operated within 
those rules. It is effective only because colleges and universities see it in their best interest 
to have an effective policing agency. GATT is struggling to carry out an NCAA-style 
function without possessing NCAA-type powers. 
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Attitudes 
Attitudes toward required changes in GA 1T rules for agricultural trade vary across 
nations. But all nations agree that some changes are needed. There is international 
agreement that nations have a right to support farm incomes, but that support should be 
given in a way that minimizes trade distortions. Beyond that, there is little common 
international understanding on the scope of the changes or even on the negotiating 
framework within which to defme the scope. 
The United States has agreed that the EC can support its farmers, but in many ways 
that would require fundamental changes in the Common Agricultural Policy. The United 
States has proposed the conversion of non-tariff barriers to bound tariffs, and gradual 
reduction in those tariffs. It has also proposed elimination of the GATI rules that allow 
the imposition of import controls for those products subject to supply control. The United 
States has advanced the idea of reinstrumentation of policies, i.e., the adoption of policies 
that provide the same level of support as now but would do so with less trade distortion. 
The EC has targeted the support programs of the-United States and the budget 
difficulties to which they contribute. It has proposed the use of a "support measurement 
unit" or SMU to measure the level of support to a nation's agriculture. Negotiations would 
then concentrate on the gradual reduction of that support. The SMU is, of course, 
constructed to favor the policies of the EC and target the policies of the United States. 
Canada has walked a tightrope in the GATI negotiations. The strength of its dairy 
and poultry lobbies force that country to seek international sanction of import restrictions 
for supply-controlled industries, even as open markets are sought for cereals. Canada and 
other members of the Cairns Group are attempting to find a middle ground between the 
United States and the EC in trade policy negotiations. 
Reality 
Failure to reach agreement in agricultural negotiations stands to have as much 
importance as an agreement. Without an agreement, trade disputes will escalate as nations, 
following the lead of the United States, unilaterally impose sanctions against the trade 
actions of other nations. In this setting, international review of essentially domestic 
agricultural policies will increase. 
A GATI agreement in agriculture would establish a similar atmosphere, except that 
rules would govern the settling of disputes. Nations would call into question any policy 
changes or program modifications that are perceived to better a particular (competitive) 
nation's trade position. The EC has already challenged the changes in the U.S. set-aside 
requirements. The United States has challenged the basic food safety law of the EC. 
The solution is to define internationally acceptable agricultural policies, and to adopt 
international procedures for switching to those acceptable policies. Of course, the United 
States could demand that our current policies be accepted; that has been our position in 
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the past. But as in the past, whatever excuse is used by the United States to justify its 
policies will be used by other nations too with regard to their own policies. 
Sometimes U.S. agricultural programs are justified, or defended, on the basis of 
their small proportion of the U.S. budget. That criterion for acceptability of agricultural 
programs -- their budget cost -- would be attractive to many nations. Nations that are 
importers routinely pass the cost of policies to their consumers without any government 
expenditure. They would welcome international acceptance of a criterion of that type. 
The reality is that, with or without a GAIT agreement, international scrutiny of 
domestic agricultural policies will increase. But without a GAIT agreement, trade will be 
less predictable and subject to unpoliced disruptions or impairment. The several 
considerations surely militate in favor of working out a practicable agreement. 
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The Economic Impact of 
A U.S.-Japan Free Trade Agreement 
James Gleckler and Luther Tweeten • 
I 
I 
Introduction 
This paper outlines economic and noneconomic implications for food and agriculture 
of a free trade agreement (FfA) between the U.S. and Japan. Political sentiments, mainly 
drawing on noneconomic issues and currently not support!ng an agreement, need to weigh 
economic and noneconomic advantages of an agreement. Economic factors could ultimately 
offset noneconomic factors, causing a shift in political sentiments. 
Free trade agreements have been most frequent among nations with similar cultural 
interests and common borders as evidenced by the EC and U.S.-Canada FfAs. While such 
agreements offer advantages of amiability and understanding among nations, they do not 
necessarily offer advantages of gains from trade which are proportional to dissimilarity in 
factor endowments and other dimensions of comparative advantage. 
Japan and the U.S. are a case in point. Japan has a comparative advantage in 
manufacturing (consumer electronics, automobiles, etc.) and, increasingly, in international 
finance. The U.S. has a comparative advantage in agricultural production, airplane 
manufacturing, and pop entertainment (television, music, movies, etc.). The large 
differences in comparative advantage imply large potential gains from trade. Other 
advantages from a U.S.-Japanese FfA include: 
1. Assurances that each country is a reliable supplier, easing fears by Japan of 
inadequate food supplies and by the U.S. of insufficient computer chips in 
case of international upheaval or policy disagreements. 
• Respectively, Professor of Agriculture and Forestry, Northeastern Oklahoma A&M College, Miami and Anderson 
Professor of Agricultural Marketing, Policy, and Trade, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, 
The Ohio State University, Columbus. Comments of Nonnan Rask are much appreciated. 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution to this analysis of a cooperative agreement with the Economic 
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2. Countervailing power. The European Community will have formidable trade 
bargaining power as intra-border measures are eliminated by the end of 1992. 
To reduce trade barriers, the EC may need to be confronted with 
countervailing power from the likes of a U.S.-Japan FfA 
3. An alternative to issue-by-issue negotiations. Currently, trade differences with 
Japan are resolved issue-by-issue after extensive and often acrimonious and 
divisive negotiations. The FTA offers a 'wholesale" approach to bilateral 
trade negotiations. 
4. An alternative to GATT negotiations. The Uruguay Round, at best, will fall 
far short of eliminating trade barriers among nations. Nations including the 
U.S. and Japan subsequently will seek alternative bilateral arrangements to 
further reduce trade barriers. 
5. A catalyst for a wider FTA (see Hamilton et al.). A U.S.-Japan FfA could 
be the catalyst for a more general relaxation of North American-East Asian 
trade barriers. The natural trade alignment of Japan with Taiwan and South 
Korea is impaired by colonial legacy. The U.S. could be an "honest broker" 
in discussions that might bring Taiwan and· Korea into an FTA that also 
includes the U.S. and Canada. Recent initiatives by Australia call for a 
Pacific Rim trade association to include not only the above countries but also 
ASEAN countries, Australia, and New Zealand (Josling). Such an option 
could be even more attractive if GATT negotiations fail. 
This paper focuses only on a U.S.-Japanese FTA, and then only on the agricultural 
impact. Trade data help to reveal areas of comparative advantage. In 1988, Japan ran a 
$52 billion merchandise trade surplus with the U.S. (Table 1). The trade balance surplus 
had two general components with very different behavior: (1) agricultural trade which in 
net provided a $7.4 billion surplus for the U.S. and (2) a nonagricultural product trade 
surplus for Japan of $59 billion. Data in Table 1 clearly point to a comparative advantage 
for the U.S. in agricultural products such as "food and live animals" and a comparative 
advantage for Japan in "machinery and transport equipment." 
Table· 2 further illustrates U.S.-Japanese trade relationships based on 1985 data. As 
expected Japan relies relatively heavily ( 42 percent in 1985) on U.S. markets for export of 
"machinery and transport equipment." Ironically, it also relies very heavily (61 percent) on 
the U.S. for import of machinery and equipment. Japan on average received 20 percent of 
its imports from the U.S. but derived 33 percent of its food imports from the U.S. 
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Table 1. Merchandise Trade between the U.S. and Japan, 1988, U.S. Basis. 
U.S. Exports U.S. Imports Surplus 
Item to Japan• from Japanb or 
Deficit 
($ Million) 
Grand total 37,732.1 89,802.1 - 52,070.0 
Agricultural commodities 7,631.8 231.5 7,400.3 
Nonagricultural 'COmmodities 30,100.3 89,570.6 - 59,470.3 
0) Food and live animals 6,759.5 329.7 6,429.8 \0 
Beverages and tobacco ---- 43.7 - 43.7 
Oils and fats, animal and vegetable 65.2 14.2 51.0 
Crude materials (metals, etc.) ---- 155.7 - 155.7 
Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials 1,422.4 107.4 1,315.0 
Chemicals and related products 4,001.7 2,187.2 1,814.5 
Manufactured goods and articles 5,996.4 15,724.1 - 9,727.7 
Machinery and transport equipment 9,830.2 70,231.6 - 60,401.4 
Other 9,656.7 1,008.5 8,648.2 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
• FAS value. 
b Customs value. 
Table 2. Merchandise Trade of Japan with the U.S. and the World, 1985. 
Jananese E2g2orts J ananese I mnorts 
Item to U.S. to World u.s. from U.S. from World u.s. 
Share Share 
$ Million $ Million Percent $ Million $ Million Percent 
Total 65,277.6 175,637.8 37.2 25,793.0 129,538.7 19.9 
Foods 400.6 1,315.7 30.4 5,084.9 15,547.3 32.7 
Textiles 1,073.6 6,263.2 17.1 442.4 2,155.1 20.5 
1..0 Other raw materials 
---- ---- ---
3,373.2 9,656.7 34.9 0 
Chemical products 1,407.5 7,697.7 18.3 3,396.5 8,072.7 42.1 
Fossil fuels ---- ---- --- 1,956.1 55,790.2 3.5 
Nonmetallic mineral products 766.3 2,147.5 35.7 
Metal and metal products 4,619.1 18,491.1 25.0 6,93.6 6,232.1 11.1 
Machinery and transportation 
equipment 52,461.9 126,178.9 41.6 7,544.8 12,371.7 61.0 
Others 4,548.6 13,543.7 33.6 3,301.5 19,712.9 16.7 
Source: Foreign Press Center, p. 49. 
Estimates of Impact 
from Trade Liberalization 
A model developed at The Ohio State University is used to estimate the impact of 
agricultural market liberalization in Japan and the United States. The model was created 
in the USDA SWOPSIM framework (see Roningen). It is a static, nonspatial, price 
equilibrium model incorporating the assumptions of neoclassical trade theory. The model 
was initialized using USDA-developed, medium-term (5-year) elasticities in the behavioral 
equations. Supply, demand, trade, and price data are from the ERS ST86 (1986) database. 
Six agricultural commodities are modeled: beef, wheat, corn, other coarse grains, rice, and 
soybeans. The model allows for interactions between commodities such as input-output 
relations and substitution in consumption and production. 
The trade regions modeled are the U.S., Japan, the European Community (EC), 
Canada, Australia, and developing exporters (Brazil, Argentina, Thailand, etc.). World 
price transmission elasticities (percentage change in domestic price resulting from 1 percent 
change in domestic price) are less than one for regions which tend to isolate their domestic 
markets. In particular, the EC price transmission elasticity is zero for all commodities 
except soybeans. 
Framework for Japanese FT A with the Rest of the World 
To gain perspective for interpreting later results for a U.S.-Japan FfA, the first 
simulation is essentially a Japan FfA with the world but allowing Japan to maintain 
domestic food production. Japanese consumers buy at international prices from a world 
with trade barriers and opportunities as they existed in 1986. A graphical conceptual 
presentation of the first simulation, where domestic production is maintained to serve 
historic self-sufficiency objectives but Japanese consumers are allowed access to rest-of-
world markets (exporters), is presented in Figure 1. 
Initially, Japanese food and agriculture markets are regulated with quotas on imports 
which hold the price at the 1986 level P, in the left panel. This border measure is 
represented by the totally inelastic supply S' and demand D', and the vertical excess demand 
(ED) in the center graph. Domestic production is Q5, consumption is QDt and imports are 
Oo • Os = 0 •. 
If producer price is maintained at P, but the Japanese consumer market is liberalized 
so consumers can buy at the world price, the excess demand in the center graph shifts to 
ED' and a new world price P' .. results which is higher than the former world price P ... 
Purchasing at the world price P'., Japanese consumers enjoy an increase in consumer 
surplus of area a+b+c+d in the left panel. Without consumer purchases at P" the 
Japanese government must purchase and resell domestically produced commodities at a cost 
of area a+ b. It forgoes import duty collections of area c. This leaves a net welfare benefit 
to Japan of area d. 
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The higher world price benefits exporting nations, as reflected in the right panel of 
Figure 1. Producers gain area e + f while consumers lose area e, leaving a net welfare gain 
to exporters (rest-of-world) of area f. 
p p 
0 .... ______ _ 
Q Q Q' 
S D D 
Quantity Q 
.. 
Japan Trade Exporters 
Figure 1. World Impacts of Japanese Consumer Liberalization. 
(1) Empirical estimates for major traders of Japanese consumer market 
liberalization. Empirical estimates of Japanese consumer market liberalization are 
presented in Table 3. The pre-liberalization producer price and quantity in Japan are 
maintained. The liberalization enables consumers to buy at world prices. Estimates apply 
to 1986 conditions providing protection for Japanese producers.· Estimates of the areas 
described in Figure 1 are listed in the columns labeled producer surplus, consumer surplus, 
budget savings, and net welfare. While having little impact on domestic markets within the 
EC, because of higher world prices the Japanese liberalization saves the European 
Community restitution funds on its subsidized exports. Some variable levy revenue is lost 
on rice. 
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Table 3. Impacts of Japanese Consumer Liberalization, with Japanese Consumers Buying at World Prices and Japanese 
Producers Receiving at least 1986 Prices, Six Agricultural Commodity Markets, 1986 Conditions.• 
Welfare Chan~ 
Country Commodity Producer Production Consumer Consumption Producer Consumer Budget Net 
Price Price Surplus Surplus Savings Welfare 
(%change) (% change) (%change) (%change) ($ million) 
u.s. Beef 1.35 0.86 0.81 -056 312 -332 0 -20 
Wheat 0.40 0.21 0.55 -0.08 37 -20 0 17 
Com -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.23 -7 5 0 -2 
Coarse Grain 059 0.35 0.77 -0.15 26 -22 0 4 
Rice 2.02 0.81 2.89 -0.71 30 -12 0 18 
Soybeans 0.09 0.05 O.o9 0.06 9 -5 0 4 
Total Change 407 -386 0 21 
Japan Beef 0 1.18 -3351 50.41 48 5556 -4132 1424 
Wheat 0 0 -47.78 1054 0 1081 -837 244 
Com 0 0 -5.39 -5.84 0 102 -76 26 
Coarse Grain 0 0 -35.94 15.79 0 332 -233 99 
Rice 0 0 -71.26 3658 0 18829 -16556 2273 
Soybeans 0 0 -0.13 0.11 0 3 0 3 
Total Change 48 25903 -21834 4069 
EC Beef 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 38 
Wheat 0 0 0 o· 0 0 14 14 
Com 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coarse Grain 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 60 
Rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 -23 -23 
Soybeans 0 0 0 0 0 -3 0 -3 
Total Change 0 -3 89 86 
Canada Beef 2.27 1.07 1.37 -1.08 51 -52 0 -1 
Wheat 059 0.20 059 -0.06 25 -9 0 16 
Com -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.36 0 0 0 0 
Coarse Grain 0.62 0.47 1,02 0.04 10 -7 0 3 
Rice 6.24 0.61 3.12 -0.76 0 -2 0 -2 
Soybeans 0.07 0.03 0.09 O.o7 0 0 0 0 
Total Change 86 -70 0 16 
1.0 
o~::o.· 
Producer Production Consumer 
Price Price 
(%change) (% change) (%change) 
2.41 1.68 1.39 
0.84 0.50 0.69 
-0.05 -0.44 -0.05 
1.29 1.05 1.23 
9.98 5.87 8.66 
0.()9 0.05 0.09 
Developing 
Exporters Beef 1.66 0.83 0.87 
Wheat 0.41 0.19 0.43 
Com -0.02 -0.15 -O.o3 
Coarse Grain 0.71 0.51 0.64 
Rice 3.08 0.97 1.68 
Soybeans 0.05 0.03 0.06 
Total Change 
Consumption 
(%change) 
-1.07 
-0.10 
0.37 
-0.24 
-3.67 
0.09 
-0.56 
0 
0.18 
-0.15 
-0.56 
0.06 
Producer 
Surplus 
44 
9 
0 
5 
4 
0 
62 
157 
10 
-7 
3 
409 
3 
575 
Welfare Chanl!:e 
Consumer Budget 
Surplus Savings 
-20 
0 
0 
-3 
0 
0 
-23 
-150 
-11 
1 
-2 
-375 
-3 
-540 
($million) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
If Japanese consumer prices are allowed to fall to world levels; purchases are made anywhere in the world where supplies are available at competitive prices. World 
impacts are as follows for: 
Beef 
Wheat 
Com 
Coarse Grain 
Rice 
Soybeans 
World Price Change(%) 
2.53 
0.98 
-0.05 
1.14 
6.24 
0.09. 
Net 
Welfare 
24 
9 
0 
2 
4 
0 
39 
7 
-1 
..(j 
1 
34 
0 
35 
(2) Empirical estimates for major world traders of Japanese producer and 
consumer market liberalization. Assumptions in Table 4 are similar to those in Table 3 
except that Japanese producers as well as consumers receive world prices. As expected, 
Japanese producer losses are substantial with full decoupling in Table 4 when compared 
with retained production incentives in Table 3. Welfare gains to Japan are $1.4 billion 
more with full farm trade liberalization than with trade liberalization only for consumers -
-area b added to din Figure 1. Production falls sharply in Japan with producers receiving 
world prices. 
World beef and wheat prices are raised approximately 1 percentage point and rice 
by 10 percentage points. With Japanese trade and commodity program liberalization, world 
price (see Tables 3 and 4 footnote) is higher in every case except corn, for which Japanese 
consumption fell slightly. This is due to minimal previous Japanese intervention in corn 
markets while distortions of wheat, coarse grain (other than corn), and rice markets were 
substantial. Substitution of cheaper feeds for corn brings a small decrease in corn 
consumption even in the face of an own-price drop. Cheaper feed inputs enable Japanese 
beef producers to post modest production and income gains. The gains would be greater 
if results in Tables 3 and 4 had been based on post-1986 conditions. 
U.S. producer benefits exceed consumer losses in the case of more open world trade 
with Japan. The U.S. was a net importer of beef in the 1986 period used to calibrate 
estimates for this study. The opening of the Japanese beef market currently underway 
could eventually make the U.S. a net exporter of beef and hence a gainer from higher world 
beef prices in Table 3. The implication is that the negative welfare gains (deadweight 
losses) for beef in 1986 shown in Table 3 may be reversed in future years, making the net 
income gain to the U.S. economy positive. U.S. beef trade reversals are examined in the 
next section. 
By design, the semi-decoupling scheme maintains income and output of Japanese 
producers. Japanese consumer gains are huge and exceed the budget costs of supporting 
producers by a substantial amount. Total welfare (full national income) gain to Japan is 
estimated to exceed $4 billion. The net welfare gain to Japan is large relative to that to 
any other region or country. It would appear that the Japanese would take initiatives to 
remove trade barriers because they have the most to gain. However, such observations do 
not account for the political realities of an influential Japanese agricultural industry wary 
of shifting its income base from consumers to taxpayers. Welfare gains to Japan would be 
even larger if producers also received the world price as in Table 4 but loss of self-
sufficiency and producers' political support might be considered a high price for economic 
gains. 
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Table 4. Impacts of Full Trade Liberalization with Japanese Producers and Consumers Receiving World Prices, Six 
Agricultural Commodity Markets, 1986 Conditions: 
Welfare Change 
Country Commodity Producer Production Consumer Consumption Producer Consumer Budget Net 
Price Price Surplus Surplus Savings Welfare 
(%change) (% change) (%change) (%change) ($million) 
u.s. Beef 1.97 1.26 1.18 -0.82 456 -483 0 -27 
Wheat 0.78 0.44 1.08 -0.23 73 -40 0 33 
Com -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.32 -7 4 0 -3 
Coarse Grain 0.70 0.41 0.92 -0.13 31 -26 0 5 
Rice 5.48 2.16 7.82 -1.87 83 -31 0 52 
Soybeans 0.15 0.09 0.16 O.o? 15 -9 0 6 
Total Change 615 -585 0 66 
Japan Beef -64.62 -33.23 -33_27 49.86 -3092 5501 -200 2215 
Wheat -90.39 -55.53 -47.43 10.92 -796 1078 -86 196 
Com -5.98 -1.83 -5.38 -9.65 0 97 ..(,() 37 
Coarse Grain -93.81 -72.95 -35.83 10.49 -281 316 -21 14 
Rice -84.32 -60.40 -69.78 34.87 -15071 18361 -22 3268 
Soybeans -78.80 -63.52 0.15 -2.44 -269 -4 0 -273 
Total Change -19509 25355 -389 5457 
EC Beef 0 0 0 0 0 0 58 58 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 31 
Com 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Coarse Grain 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 
Rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 -7 -7 
Soybeans 0.08 O.o3 0.16 -0.06 0 -5 -10 -15 
Total Change 0 -5 79 163 
Canada Beef 3.32 1.57 2.00 -1.57 76 -76 0 0 
Wheat 1.17 0.47 1.16 -0.16 51 -18 0 33 
Com -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.49 0 0 0 0 
Coarse Grain 0.74 0.55 1.22 0.12 12 -8 0 4 
Rice 16.89 157 8.45 -2.01 0 -4 0 -4 
Soybeans 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.09 0 0 0 0 
Total Change 139 -106 0 33 
Table 4 continued. 
Welfare Change 
Country Commodity Producer Production Consumer Consumption Producer Consumer Budget Net 
Price Price Surplus Surplus Savings Welfare 
(%change) (% change) (%change) (%change) ($million) 
Australia Beef 3.52 2.45 2.03 -1.56 64 -29 0 35 
Wheat 1.65 1.18 1.35 -0.24 20 -1 0 19 
Com -0.05 -0.52 -0.05 0.48 0 0 0 0 
Coarse Grain 1.51 1.25 1.47 -0.23 7 -3 0 4 
Rice 27.o3 15.43 23.45 -9.05 12 -1 0 11 
Soybeans 0.17 0.08 0.17 0.12 0 0 . 0 0 
Total Change 103 -34 0 69 
Developing 
\0 Exporters Beef 2.43 1.21 1.27 -0.81 229 -219 0 10 
...:] Wheat 0.80 0.39 0.84 0.13 19 -22 0 -3 
Com -0.02 -0.35 -O.o3 0.30 -15 1 0 -14 
Coarse Grain 0.84 0.56 0.76 -0.14 3 -3 0 0 
Rice 8.18 2.55 4.45 -1.47 1094 -991 0 103 
Soybeans 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.08 6 -5 0 1 
Total Change 1336 1239 0 96 
4 Japanese consumer prices are allowed to fall to world levels; purchases are made anywhere in the world where supplies are available at competitive prices. World 
impacts are as follows for: 
World Price Chan~ (%) 
Beef 3.69 
Wheat 1.93 
Com -0.05 
Coarse Grain 1.35 
Rice 16.89 
Soybeans 0.17. 
Framework of a U.S.-Japan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
Figure 2 presents the case of a U.S.-Japanese liberalized trade agreement. As in the 
previous simulation, Japanese producers initially are maintained at 1986 production and 
income levels. Additionally, Japanese base imports from third-countries, including 
Australia, Canada, and other exporters except the U.S. are not changed from their initial 
quantity Oo - 0 5 = 0. = ED. (The difference between D and D' at P, in the left panel is 
U.S. exports x to Japan at the initial price in Japan.) Additional imports from consumer 
market liberalization are solely from U.S. markets, making excess demand for U.S. exports 
to Japan D- D' =ED' under the FrA The U.S. maintains 1986 commodity programs in 
all scenarios. World price continues at P. but U.S.-Japan equilibrium FrA price is PN. 
Japanese imports from the rest of the world, 0. in Figure 2, fall short of 0. in Figure 1 by 
U.S. exports x to Japan before the FrA 
Japan 
p 
0 Q 
• 
U.S.-Japan Trade 
p 
PN 1------~~~ 
P.t---~~ 
u.s. 
Figure 2. A U.S.-Japanese Liberalized Trade Agreement. 
U.S. domestic supply S and demand D give rise to excess supply quantity ~ - q0 
exported at world price P_. Of this quantity, x went to Japan before the FrA Thus the 
post-FrA excess supply curve for U.S. agricultural exports to Japan isS- D- (~ • ~- x) 
= ES. The U.S. excess supply intersects Japan's excess demand at the new U.S.-Japanese 
trade price (PN), allowing Japanese consumers to benefit by area a+b+c+d. Net welfare 
gain to Japan is d with Japanese prod~cers' incentives retained and is b+d when producers' 
incentives are allowed to fall to U.S. levels. Price PN will be higher when producer prices 
are allowed to fall in Japan. Lower Japanese production raises PN. 
To prevent losing producer gains from leveling of world prices through arbitrage 
under the FrAin Figure 2, the U.S. government must be able to separate markets to Japan 
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so that PN and the world price, P., do not converge. U.S. taxpayers are assumed to provide 
an export subsidy equal to PN- P. to maintain world price at P .. The cost to U.S. taxpayers 
is area g or (qs - qo - x) times (PN - P.). The righthand graph shows a gain to U.S. 
producers of e+f+g+h compared to continuation of Japanese trade restrictions. This gain 
to producers is partly offset by the loss to U.S. consumers of area e and loss to taxpayers 
of g under the Ff A, leaving a net gain to the nation of f +h. 
Comparing Japanese liberarization in a world market as shown in Figure 1 to a U.S.-
Japanese trade pact in Figure 2, PN falls less from P, in Figure 2 than does P,. in Figure 1. 
Hence Japan gains less and the U.S. gains more with an FTA than when Japan opens its 
markets to the world. Japanese agricultural imports with liberalization are less in Figure 
2 than in Figure 1. Figures 1 and 2 indicate only partial equilibrium (in farm products) and 
do not show gains from an FT A in nonfarm markets. 
All commodities included in the study are net U.S. exports and conform to the 
conceptual framework in Figure 2 with the exception of beef, which is a net import and is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The increase in U.S. price and production results in price PN. 
Production increases from a. to a·. with a·. -a. exported to Japan. To maintain domestic 
sales of a. at price P. the government must subsidize the original production at a cost of 
area a, leaving a net welfare gain of area b. 
Price 
s 
D 
0 Quantity 
Figure 3. Maintaining Producer Gains - U.S. Beef. 
(1) Empirical Estimates for the U.S. and Japan of an FTA with Japanese Consumer 
Market Liberalization. Empirical estimates of the U.S.-Japanese free trade agreement with 
only Japanese consumer market liberalization are presented in Table 5. Because 
advantages to U.S. producers of the Japanese consumer market liberalization are assumed 
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to be maintained by government, there is no impact on the "world market" of third-country 
economies. Japanese gains are less than those when consumers are allowed full access to 
world prices as shown in Table 3, but they are substantial nonetheless. U.S. gains, on the 
other hand, are about 16 times greater when a trade agreement directs Japanese consumer 
liberalization solely into U.S. markets. Especially significant are the gains to beef and rice 
producers. Total world welfare gain from this simulation is an estimated $2,745 million. 
U.S. gains of $350 million in Table 5 under the FfA are far larger than with world trade 
liberalization in Table 3 but Japanese net welfare gains in Table 5 are cut to about half 
those in Table 3. 
(2) Empirical estimates for the U.S. and Japan of an FTA with Japanese producer 
and consumer market liberalization. Americans gain more when Japan's producer prices 
are allowed to fall to U.S.-Japan equilibrium FfA price levels in Table 6 compared to 
Table 5 where Japanese production was maintained. As expected, the sum of welfare gains 
in Table 6 with lower Japanese producer prices is greater than in Table 5 but both 
situations increase world welfare less than the opening of Japanese markets to world trade 
as depicted in Tables 3 and 4. 
One interesting aspect of Table 6 is the increase in U.S. beef trade. Initially (1986 
conditions), U.S. net trade is -739 (net imports) thousand metric tons. Net trade in beef 
at the new equilibriums corresponding to the simulations in Tables 3 through 6 is: 
Table 3 
Table 4 
Table 5 
Table 6 
-573 thousand metric tons 
-349 
-489 
+565. 
When only Japanese consumer markets are part of the liberalized trade arrangement 
(Tables 3 and 5), or when the world is given full access to liberalized consumer and 
producer markets in Japan (Table 4), U.S. net trade in beef remains negative. When both 
producers and consumers in Japan respond to the U.S.-Japanese negotiated FfA price 
(Table 6), the U.S. becomes a net exporter of 565 thousand metric tons of beef. 
Federal budget costs rise in the U.S. with the FfA as noted in Tables 5 and 6. The 
reason for the increase is the necessity for export subsidies for exports to countries other 
than Japan-- as noted in the earlier conceptual framework. 
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Table S. Impacts of a U.S.-Japanese Free Trade Agreement with Japanese Consumers Buying at U.S.-Japanese Internal 
Market Equilibrium Prices and Japanese Producers Receiving 1986 Prices, Six Agricultural Commodity Markets, 1986 
Conditions: 
Welfare Chang!; 
Country Commodity Producer Production Consumer Consumption Producer Consumer Budget Net 
Price Price Surplus Surplus Savings Welfare 
(%change) (% change) (%change) (%change) ($million) 
u.s. Beer 5.63 3.46 0 0 1302 0 -1282 20 
Wheat 3.27 1.64 4.51 -0.83 297 -165 -129 3 
Com -0.51 0.22 -0.77 0.79 lOS 17 0 122 
Coarse Grain 3.30 1.94 4.32 -1.16 147 -120 -22 5 
Rice 71.71 25.86 110.83 -17.01 1316 -401 -711 204 
Soybeans 0.27 0.16 0.28 0.26 27 -15 -10 2 
Total Change 3194 .Q!4 -2154 356 
Japan Beef 0 1.04 -32.73 48.66 42 5398 -4035 1405 
Wheat 0 0 -45.19 18.88 0 1112 -786 326 
Com 0 0 -4.53 -5.47 0 86 -65 21 
Coarse Grain 0 0 -33.13 20.12 0 322 -216 106 
Rice 0 0 -38.79 13.06 0 9545 -9011 534 
Soybeans 0 0 -0.05 0.08 0 1 0 1 
Total Change 42 16464 -14113 2393 
6 Economic outcomes including prices in countries other than the U.S. and Japan do not change perceptibly from 1986 conditions. 
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Table 6. Impacts of U.S.-Japanese Free Trade Agreement with Fully Liberalized Japanese Markets at U.S.-Japanese Market 
Equilibrium Prices, Six Agricultural Commodity Markets, 1986 Conditions: 
Welfare Chan~ 
Country Commodity Producer Production Consumer Consumption Producer Consumer Budget Net 
Price Price Surplus Surplus Savings Welfare 
(%change) (% change) (%change) (%change) ($million) 
u.s. Beef 8.10 5.00 0 0 1894 0 -1767 127 
Wheat 5.00 2.62 6.89 -1.47 464 -251 -187 26 
Corn 0.55 0.23 0.84 1.11 112 -94 -9 9 
Coarse Grain 3.78 2.21 4.95 .1.()9 168 -137 -16 15 
Rice 136.30 41.06 194.40 -23.66 2482 4'l7 -1083 732 
Soybeans 0.44 0.27 0.47 0.34 44 -27 -12 5 
Total Change 5164 -1176 -3074 914 
Japan Beef -62.79 -31.98 -32.16 47.41 -3024 5282 -862 1396 
Wheat -89.40 -59.87 -43.64 22.53 -796 1114 -11 307 
Corn -4.95 -1.51 -4.46 -9.04 0 81 -65 16 
Coarse Grain -93.44 -76.66 -32.63 17.27 -281 310 -10 19 
Rice -30.29 -16.51 -13.65 3.74 -2715 3229 -5 509 
Soybeans -78.74 -63.44 0.43 -2.43 -269 -11 0 -280 
Total Change -7085 10005 -953 1967 
a Economic outcomes for other countries do not change perceptibly from 1986 conditions. 
Conclusions 
The U.S. has a strong comparative advantage in agricultural products and Japan in 
manufactured transportation and consumer electronics products. The nations, especially 
Japan, c~n realize very large economic benefits from a free trade agreement. Major 
conclusions of this study are as follows: 
1. Economic gains are large to Japan from trade liberalization, even with semi-
decoupling that preserves domestic farm output and producers' incomes but 
allows consumers access to international markets and prices. 
2. Economic gains to Japan are larger under multilateral trade liberalization 
than under a U.S.-Japan FfA 
3. Welfare gains to Japanese consumers are especially large with trade 
liberalization. Losses of the government from import revenues are substantial 
but do not offset gains to consumers so net gains to Japan are positive. The 
gains from free trade may also be regarded as· gains from commodity program 
liberalization. 
4. Full multilateral liberalization, allowing prices worldwide to producers and 
consumers to fall to equilibrium world levels, would increase net welfare to 
Japan by an estimated $18.5 billion under 1986 conditions (Tweeten and 
Gleckler). Gains to Japan of over $5 billion when it alone liberalizes 
consumer and producer markets to receive world prices are sizable as noted 
in Table 4 but benefits to Japan would be much greater if all nations 
liberalized. Semi-decoupling allowing consumer prices to fall to world levels 
but maintaining farm output, prices, and incomes of producers in Japan at 
1986 levels further reduces net benefits from full commodity program and 
trade liberalization. 
5. Given continuation of self-sufficiency in Japan, results indicate that welfare 
gains to the U.S. from trade liberalization are fairly modest overall but are 
at least 16 times as large with an FTA (Table 5) than with multilateral trade 
liberalization (Table 3). 
6. Worldwide trade and commodity program liberalization would increase U.S. 
net welfare (full national income) by $5.1 billion (Tweeten and Gleckler). 
Thus an FTA with Japan (Table 6) would produce approximately one-fifth of 
the potential gains from worldwide trade and commodity program 
liberalization. 
7. Major welfare gains to the U.S. from multilateral "trade" liberalization noted 
in (6) above come mostly from U.S. commodity program liberalization. 
Without U.S. commodity program changes but with world trade barriers 
removed, net welfare of the U.S. would increase $2.8 billion -- still much 
greater than benefits of an FfA with Japan only. On economic grounds 
alone, results indicate that an FfA with Japan is preferred to the status quo 
but produces less welfare gains to the U.S. than multilateral world trade and 
commodity program liberalization. 
8. U.S. producers are more favored in prices, production, and income under an 
FfA with Japan (Tables 5 and 6) than with either multilateral trade 
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liberalization alone or with multilateral world trade and commodity program 
liberalization combined. 
9. U.S. farm producers gain more than U.S. food consumers from a U.S.-Japan 
FfA However, U.S. consumer surplus losses in food would be offset by 
consumer gains in nonfood items imported from Japan. 
10. Based on the estimates of this study, the Japanese might be expected to take 
initiative toward a free trade agreement. The strength of that commitment 
could be enhanced by failure of GATT negotiations. The foregoing analysis 
begs a question: If the gains from freer trade are as large as indicated, why 
are Japanese accommodations to such trade so grudging and modest? Semi-
decoupling in theory would protect producers, agribusinesses, and self-
sufficiency. However, interest groups in Japan (as in the United States) may 
feel uneasy depending on a politically vulnerable direct and obvious 
production subsidy. Lack of political influence and knowledge by consumers 
also plays a role. 
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Korea's Agricultural Import Market 
and Effects of Market Liberalization 
Jong-Yong Kim* 
I will share with you my views of Korea's agricultural market and the opportunities 
it holds for U.S. agricultural exporters in the areas of bulk commodities and high-value 
exports. I also will explain some of the Korean government's most recent import 
liberalization efforts and how they fit into the ambitious overall long-term market 
liberalization scheme for the nation. 
Since 1988, Korea has become the second largest buyer of U.S. agricultural products. 
Considering Korea's size and income level, this represents a sizable share of U.S. 
agricultural exports. In 1988 alone Korea imported approximately $2.3 billion worth of U.S. 
agricultural products-- 99.6 percent of its imported soybeans were grown in the U.S., 82 
percent of its corn, 58 percent of its total wheat imports, and 68 percent of its cotton 
imports. Korea also imports 77 percent of its raw hide from the United States. The total 
value of U.S. agricultural exports to Korea this year is expected to increase to approximately 
$2.5 billion in 1989, compared with about $2.25 billion in 1988. Korea is a growing 
agricultural market. 
In addition to the flourishing agricultural commodity trade that is already taking 
place between Korea and the United States, tremendous progress has been made toward 
a full opening of the agricultural market. For example: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Because of the Korean government's efforts toward removing trade barriers, 
the portion of liberalized agricultural products has increased from 55 percent 
in 1980 to 72.6 percent in 1988. 
The Korean government formed a Task Force in December 1988 to revise the 
schedules for agricultural liberalization through 1991. The new liberalization 
plan, which was announced on April 8 of 1989, will open the market to an 
additional 243 agricultural items. Among these items, at least 62 are of 
interest to U.S. exporters. 
Import duties for agricultural products have been reduced gradually from an 
average of 30 percent in 1984 to 25 percent this year. Again, U.S. interests 
have been specially considered. 
As to non-tariff barriers, the number of items under import surveillance has 
been reduced and import procedures have been relaxed. 
Agricultural Attache, Embassy of Korea, Washington, D.C 
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To further facilitate the market opening process, Korea has dispatched several buying 
missions to the U.S. Purchase contracts worth some $3.3 billion U.S. dollars were signed 
with American suppliers as a result of these missions. In March 1988, Korean agricultural 
leaders visited the U.S. and purchased over $137 million worth of American corn and 
soybeans. Beef buying missions came to American in April and August and purchased a 
total of $17 million worth of American boneless beef by open tender. 
At the same time that our government is promoting more agricultural trade with the 
U.S., it is also attempting to meet the structural adjustment challenges that lie ahead. Last 
December a structural adjustment program was launched. The most important part of this 
program will promote non-agricultural income for farmers to reduce their dependency on 
inefficient agricultural production. To this end, the government is encouraging the 
development of small agro-industrial complexes in rural areas to create non-farm 
opportunities for displaced farmers. 
This program and other economic and educational efforts are intended to create a 
more competitive agricultural sector. This is a long-term _goal, however. Before these 
programs are fully implemented and producing the expected results, there will be time lags 
and adjustments. 
Beef deserves particular mention as a special case because it is one of the 
exceptional areas where the Korean government has been forced to move a little more 
slowly in commodity import liberalization, both for political and economic reasons. The 
Korean government has an import quota on beef which permits 50,000 metric tons of beef 
imports per year. This import quota number was not simply pulled out of a hat, but is the 
result of careful calculations made by our government based upon domestic consumption 
demands for type and quantity of imported beef. 
U.S. beef producers would like to see the beef quota increased if not entirely lifted. 
The controversy surrounding beef imports, however, obscures the fact that U.S. high-quality 
beef (HQB) imports have actually done quite well and continue to do so on the Korean 
market since the market was partially opened and a quota was put in place in July of 1988. 
This is reinforced by the fact that the quota assures U.S. beef exporters a potential market 
share that they might not otherwise have, given the competition from Australia and New 
Zealand which hold a price advantage over the U.S. in some types of beef exports. In 1983, 
when the Korean government suspended beef imports, the U.S. share of the Korean beef 
import market was only 1.6 percent. As of August 1989, however, the U.S. share was 28.3 
percent or 11,900 metric tons of the 42,000 metric tons of total beef imports. 
For several reasons, Korea has maintained a quota and moves only gradually to 
liberalize beef imports: 
• Agricultural income in Korea derives heavily from beef production. This issue 
is not simply one of industrial competitiveness and survival, but one of survival 
for Korean farmers as a group. 
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Forty-eight percent of Korea's farmers are cattle farmers owning an average 
2.2 head of cattle per household. Livestock income is 13.9 percent of total 
farm income. And off-farm income is about 40 percent of total farm income. 
Clearly, Korean farmers rely heavily upon their cattle income. 
The Korean beef industry is vulnerable, poor, and small -- only one-fiftieth 
the size of America's -- and therefore qualified for some means of protection 
under a quota system. The United States has its own form of protection for 
the meat industry in its Meat Import Act of 1979 which requires the President 
to impose quotas on the import of certain meats (mainly beef) if the level is 
projected to exceed a certain amount. 
A quota happens to be the most appropriate stage of import liberalization in the 
case of beef at the present time, given the size and frailty of the Korean beef industry and 
the level of domestic demand. But the Korean government does not consider beef a 
permanently exempt category in the overall scheme of agricultural import liberalization. 
Compared with the past, beef imports, particularly from the U.S., have come a long way. 
While the beef quota is in place, the Korean government is implementing a Livestock 
Development Plan within the framework of a comprehensive Rural Development Plan to 
facilitate adjustments in the agricultural sector that will ultimately promote free and fair 
competition. 
The Korean government will allow more beef imports with expansion of domestic 
demand for beef. Foreign exporters are guaranteed at least a 40 percent share of the 
Korean beef market, and that market will continue to grow as our economy prospers and 
consumer income grows. The actual level of U.S. beef exports will assuredly grow along 
with the market. In the future with the help and understanding of the U.S., the Korean 
government will continue to keep U.S. beef trade interests on the agenda as it sets a course 
for liberalization and adjustment. 
In the meantime, the Korean government is maintaining a steady and progressive 
agricultural import policy which will continually benefit commodity exporters by expanding 
commercial opportunities. We remain committed to this despite some political difficulties 
which have arisen over agricultural trade issues. Beef again represents the most extreme 
of cases, but serves to illustrate some of the political problems which the Korean 
government faces domestically with its market-opening efforts. The democratization of 
Korea has allowed the radical student opposition to shift their focus from strictly political 
matters to trade issues, particularly agricultural matters. Farmers received strong support 
from students and members of the opposition parties in their campaign against the 
government's resumption of beef 1mports. This collusion between political activists and 
farmers can be seen as the driving force behind the highly publicized anti-American 
sentiment in Korea. 
Yet, within a relatively short period of time, and often under adverse conditions, 
Korea has maintained a steady and progressive market opening policy. Compared to other 
nations during similar periods of economic development, Korea is more advanced in market 
liberalization. With this in mind, we hope that U.S. legislators, businessmen, and exporters 
will bring a measure of patience to developments in this field. 
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Consolidated Biscuit and 
Pacific Rim Exporting: 
A Success Story 
Joseph Cristo· 
Consolidated Biscuit has been a producer of packaged cookies and crackers for 27 
years. We are primarily contract packers but also sell price line warehouse and distributor 
programs. 
Our emphasis has not been in exporting. Our experience though has been a 
profitable one from a business standpoint and a rewarding one from a personal standpoint. 
Our product line was sought out by exporters who felt they could represent us in the Pacific 
Rim countries. We proceeded by allowing exporters to present our products. 
Our export distributors had some success, but the additional exposure through the 
Ohio Department of Agriculture and the Mid-American Agra-Trade Council has tripled our 
business and allowed us the opportunity to communicate directly with buying groups on tour 
here in the U.S. These meetings have enabled us to forge new selling opportunities and 
understand more fully the needs of our customers. 
As related to our products, our customers are looking for value-sized, portion 
packages. They avoid many additives and preservatives. Our company's direction has not 
been to develop export markets but our product lines more than meet the criteria exporters 
have put forth. 
We have chosen to continue with those who represent us overseas. The exporters 
have done a good job and in some cases have even arranged for distribution on the local 
levels. Our exporters work on a F.O.B. plant price list, arrange traffic, and· prepare all 
export papers. They represent us in five locations and have local representatives to gather 
information and report to us new opportunities. Our goal is to continue to be represented 
in this way for several years and to increase our variety mix and presence. The current 
system allows us this flexibility without the large cost commitment of company 
representation. 
Assistant Vice President of Sales and Marketin& Consolidated Biscuit Company, McComb, Ohio. 
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